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Tim PURPOSE OF THIS PAPER is threefold: to explain Soviet choice
among sources of finance, to present and analyze the relevant data,
and to evaluate the fiscal and monetary policies pursued. It should
be stated at the outset that the sum of amounts collected from the
various sources of finance always substantially exceeds the value
of gross national investment. This is because from the same pools
of funds the Soviet government finances not only investment in
fixed and working capital, but government stockpiles of strategic
materials, expenditures of the Ministry of Armed Forces for defense,
administrative activities of the various departments of the govern-
ment, expenditures on health and education, transfer payments, sub-
sidies to state enterprises which sell their output at below-cost
prices, and gross expenditures of the machine tractor station com-
plex.' Since budgetary receipts, the largest single source of funds,
are not earmarked for specific expenditures, there is no way of de-
termining how the one category of expenditures which is directly
relevant to economic development, viz, gross investment, was fi-
nanced. We are limited to discussing the sources of finance of the
whole of the "nonconsumption" activities of the Soviet state, loosely
defining "nonconsumption" as the sum of goods and services pur-
chased by the state plus transfer payments to the household. Because
of our interest in how the state planned its economic expansion,
investment from private profits and private depreciation funds will
not be considered; private investment expenditures were, however,
insignificant in all but the first year or two of the period under re-
view. Discussion will center around the first three Five-Year Plan
periods, i.e. from 1928/1929, when the first Plan went into operation,
until 1940, the third and last completed year of the Third Plan
(which was truncated by World War II). This period is adequate
Part of the research for this paper was accomplished while I was attached
to the Russian Research Center, Harvard University. The financial assistance
of that organization is gratefully acknowledged, as are the critical comments
of Mathilda Holzman and Gregory Grossman.
Before 1930 the transportation and communications systems were included
in the budget on a gross basis; this was true of almost all state enterprises during
War Communism (1918-1921).
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•to illustrate the problems faced and policies adopted by Soviet
planners.
Before turning to the sources of finance, a few words will be
devoted to a consideration of the significance of money and finance
for the functioning of the Soviet economy. Those unfamiliar with
the Soviet economy may be misled by the emphasis on the words
"planning" and "controls" into thinking that money is not important
in the Soviet economy. While the Soviets rely more on direct eco-
nomic controls than any other nation in the world today, and while'
such controls, where they are used, substitute for money and the
market mechanism as the allocator of scarce resources,, money has
not been replaced by direct controls. There are no direct controls
in large sectors of the Soviet economy. Consumer goods, for example,
are distributed at present by the market mechanism; the amount
of consumer goods which any household can purchase is determined
by its current and accumulated earnings. The labor market, though
less free than it was in the 1930's, still depends primarily on dif-
ferential wage payments for the allocation of labor. Other markets
(raw materials and producer goods), though on the whole more
subject to direct controls, do nevertheless contain substantial areas
in which free market forces are still allowed to operate. Even where
allocation is accomplished directly, to the extent that prices provide
the planners with a basis for allocation, money functions as a
standard of value, if not as a medium of exchange.2 Failure by the
Soviets to keep their financial house in order wifi have a deleterious
effect on the economy (through reduced incentives, misallocation
of resources, etc.) so long as markets and prices are used by them
to perform economic functions.
1. Choice among Sources of Finance
A listing of the major Soviet sources of finance has a conventional
ring: direct taxation of the population, sales taxes, profits taxes, sales
of government bonds to the population and to state institutions, re-
tained profits of enterprises, depreciation reserves, bank credit,
household savings. While there are many real similarities between
the above categories and their Western counterparts, closer examina-
tion reveals substantial differences both of an institutional nature
and in their relative importance. A cursory glance at Table 1 reveals
2Moneycontinues to flow, of course, but the possessor of money has so little




Sources of Soviet Finance as Percentages
of Adjusted Total, 1937
Major indirect or commodity taxes 71.9
Direct taxes 3.8
Sales of government bonds to population 41
Miscellaneous budgetary receipts 7.3
Retained profits of state enterprises 4.6
Indivisible fund of collective farms 1.7
Depreciation reserves 5.4
Voluntary household savings 1.0
Increase of currency in circulation 1.4
Source: Taken from Tables 3 and 4 below. The above items total to more
than 100 per cent for reasons discussed in the notes to Tables 3 and 4.
that the financial path followed by the Soviet Union differs in several
significant respects from the paths followed by many Western
nations.
FOREIGN BORROWING
Outstanding for its absence from Table 1 is foreign borrowing.
I do not think it would be possible to single out over the past 150
years many nations which have industrialized, especially in the
early stages, without some foreign aid. The Soviets industrialized
without any significant foreign aid, not because they wanted to—
they did not—but because the Western World was hostile to theme
and they, in turn, were hostile to and distrustful of Western nations.
This was not a climate in which international capital was likely to
flow freely and abundantly. With some minor exceptions, the Soviets
paid in gold, commodities, and in imperial crown jewels for all
goods purchased from other nations in the interwar period. In
recent years the situation has changed somewhat. During the war,
of course, the Russians received considerable help from the United
States in the form of lend-lease shipments; and since the war repara-
tions have contributed, in some years, respectable sums to budget
receipts.4 Finally, there may be considerable capital flow between
the Soviet Union and the countries within its political orbit, but
on this there is very little reliable information as to either 'amount
or direction.
And not only for ideological reasons. Remember that Western investors took
a heavy loss when the Bolsheviks refused to honor the very large foreign debts
of the Russian imperial government.
4Amounting to as much as 3 to 4 per cent of total budget receipts.
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VOLUNTABY SAVINGS
The Soviets have always encouraged voluntary saving by the
population. A large network of banks in both urban and rural areas
has been developed to foster the saving habit; the 5 per cent interest
on time deposits (six months or more) is the highest obtainable in
the Soviet Union;5 the Currency Reform of December 1947 applied
a much more favorable conversion rate to savings deposits than to
either cash or government bonds. Nevertheless, understandably
enough, savings have never amounted to much in the Soviet Union.
The annual increment to savings deposits is only a fraction of 1 per
cent of total household money income.6 The average Soviet citizen
is in much too great need of current goods and services to put aside
large sums of money to meet future needs. And those future needs
which induce the greatest amount of saving in Western nations (e.g.
provision against sickness, accidents, old age, unemployment, etc.)
are relatively well provided for in the Soviet Union by a compre-
hensive social security system. Furthermore, the incentive to save
must certainly have been vitiated by twenty years of rapidly rising
prices in the consumer goods markets, not ending until the currency
reform of 1947. Finally, of course, the state imposes upon the popu-
lation such a high rate of compulsory saving that little is left to
individual initiative.8
COMMODITY TAXES
Most of the compulsory savings of the economy are collected by
the state in the form of taxes and are reflected in the budget ac-
counts;5 and indirect or commodity taxes are responsible for from
two-thirds to three-fourths of budgetary receipts. The three prin-
cipal commodity taxes are the turnover tax, deductions from the
Demand dçposits pay only 3 per cent.
8 Cf. F. D. Holzman, "The Burden of Soviet Taxation," American Economic
Review, September 1953, Table 1.
Since the currency reform, consumer goods prices have declined steadily;
this may eventually have a positive effect on the incentive to save. From 1928
to 1947, consumer goods prices increased, on the average, about twentyfold.
Cf. Nawn Jasny, The Soviet Price System, Stanford University Press, 1951,
Chap. 2.
8 Perhaps it should also be noted that the Soviet rural population appears
to have the usual peasant distrust of banks and prefers to hold a large part
of its savings in the form of cash.
° The Soviet state budget is a consolidated budget consisting of the all-
Union, republican, and local budgets. It is equivalent to the sum of the federal,
state, and local budgets in the United States.
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profits of state enterprises (profits tax), and the social insurance
markup. The turnover tax is essentially a sales tax levied, at present,
exclusively on consumer goods—except for petroleum and petroleum
products, where the tax substitutes for explicit rent payments. Be-
fore 1949 it was levied on producer goods. as well, but for fiscal
control of the tax-paying enterprises rather than for revenue. The
rates on consumer goods are highly differentiated, varying from 1
per cent of the selling price on some commodities to as much as 90
per cent on others.'°
The deduction from profits is correctly not called a tax on enter-
prise11 by the Soviets because it applies to nationalized industries.
The state does not tax the profits of its own industries; it simply
transfers money from one state account to another. From a fiscal
point of view the deduction from profits, as part of profits, adds,
to the price paid by the consumer; in this respect it does not differ
from the turnover tax and can properly be considered a commodity
tax on the household. Every enterprise pays a minimum 10 per cent
tax on profits for purposes of fiscal control. The remaining profits
are used as needed to finance investment planned for the enterprise
and to make payments into the Directors' Fund.12 Any surplus above
these needs is deducted into the budget.
The social insurance markup is a form of payroll tax, and for our
•purposes can be looked upon as adding to the price of commodities
bought by the household, just like the turnover and profits taxes.
The receipts from this tax are derived as additions to the wage
funds of enterprises, the percentage varying from 3.7 to 10.7, de-
pending on conditions of employment and other factors in the
separate branches of the economy. It is claimed that part of the
•receipts from this tax are earmarked for sickness and old age
insurance.'3
Why is commodity taxation the dominant method of extracting
10 Looked upon as a markup over cost, as is customary in the West, the tax
rates are much higher, of course. A 50 per cent tax becomes one of 100 per
cent; a 90 per cent tax becomes one of 900 per cent.
11 Although for convenience it will be referred to as a profits tax.
12 For incentive reasons from 1 to 5 per cent of planned profits and 15 to
45 per cent of overplan profits are deducted into the Directors' Fund. These
amounts are disbursed as bonuses to workers and• managers, for workers' hous-
ing, for cultural projects, and for extra-plan investment in the enterprises.
18 We might also have included in the category of taxes which enter the
commodity price structure the incomes of economic organizations which are
allocated "to the trade unions and special funds for workers' training and
education" (cf. Abram Bergson, "Soviet National Income and Product," Quar-
terly Journal of Economics, May 1950, p. 288).
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savingsfrom the population in the Soviet Union? Conversely, why
is little reliance placed upon income (direct) taxation, the form
of levy preferred in the United States and in many other Western
nations?14 Soviet preference for commodity taxation is certainly not
to be explained on ideological grounds. In fact, the predominance
of the turnover tax among Soviet taxes has proved embarrassing
to Soviet economists. Marxist writers consistently attacked indirect
taxes as socially inequitable and regressive; bad associations also
stem from the reliance of the tsars on highly regressive excise taxes
(especially on alcoholic beverages) for the bulk of their revenue.
That the Soviets rely on commodity taxation in spite of their "ideo-
logical" bias attests to its superiority for their purposes.'5
Soviet preference for commodity taxation appears to rest pri-
marily on three considerations. First, there is the "money illusion,"
which has it that workers are more conscious of the impact on their
economic position of changes in wages than of the impact produced
by changes in prices. A corollary to this is the hypothesis that workers
are more sensitive to changes in direct taxes (and thus in take-home
pay) than to changes in indirect taxes (reflected in commodity
prices). The money illusion, therefore, would cause commodity and
income taxes of equal size to• have different impacts on work in-
centives. This is particularly important in the Soviet Union, where
almost all income is earned income. Analytically, it is possible to
separate the impact of taxes on incentives into at least two categories:
the effect on the work-leisure ratio and the effect on differential
wages as a factor in choosing between jobs. Most writers dealing
with this subject concentrate on the work-leisure ratio, arguing that
high taxes, and particularly high marginal rates of tax, reduce the
incentive to work, and that indirect taxes, as a consequence of the
14 The Soviet income tax on the urban pOpulation does not differ substantially
from the income taxes in other countries except that different social and eco-
nomic classes pay according to different rate schedules in application of Soviet
"class policy." Thus workers, artists, professionals with private practices (e.g.
lawyers and doctors), and private shopkeepers pay at rapidly ascending rates
(on identical money incomes) from left to right. The' rural population pays
a very different sort of tax (called the agricultural tax) because the bulk of
peasant income is in kind. This necessitates, among other things, fairly cum-
bersome methods of assessing personal income and estimating the amom-it of
tax to be paid. The agricultural tax discriminates in favor of the collective
farmer and against the private peasant.
15 In fact, for about twenty years they have not referred to it as a tax on
the population, but rather as "accumulation of socialized industry," implying
that the amounts returned to the budget are a result solely of great increases
in productivity.
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illusion, minimize the disincentive effects of taxes. This line of reason-
ing ignores the income effect of taxation,'6 or at least assumes that
the substitution effect between work and leisure is more important
than the income effect. There is no empirical evidence, to my knowl-
edge, to support this assumption, and, in fact, the income effect may
actually be strong enough to induce Soviet workers to greater effort.
If this were the case, it could not be argued that the Soviet choice
of commodity taxation preserves work incentives.
It can be argued, without equivocation, that the Soviets took ad-
vantage of the money illusion effects of commodity taxation to pre-
serve the effectiveness of their differential wage structure as an in-
centive mechanism for allocating labor. In order to attract workers,
Soviet policy has been to pay higher wages to persons in jobs requir-
ing greater skills, in expanding industries, and in jobs or areas where
work conditions are undesirable. Up until the late 1920's or early
1930's this policy had not been implemented successfully, hampered
to a considerable extent as it was by the hangovers of an earlier
"equalitarian" philosophy regarding wage differentials.1r An attempt
was made to improve the situation; in 1931 Stalin intervened and,
in a speech calling for greater wage differentials, set the new policy.
He said: "In a number of our factories, wage scales are drawn up in
such a way as to practically wipe out the difference between skilled
labour and unskilled labour, between heavy work and light work.
The consequence of wage equalization is that the unskilled worker
lacks the incentive to become a skilled worker and is thus deprived
of the prospect of advancement;... inorder to get skilled workers
we must give the unskilled worker a stimulus and prospect of ad-
vancement, of rising .to a higher position.."Bergson'swage
study indicates that wage differentials in the Soviet Union in 1934
were about as great as those in the United States at a comparable
stage (1904) of economic development.19
In the late 1920's and early 1930's, at the same time that Soviet
wage differentials were being increased for incentive reasons, taxes
were also being increased. The average rate of taxation about
doubled from 1926 to 1936, increasing by substantial amounts al-
16Thatpersons having their incomes reduced by taxes would tend to work
harder.
irCf.Abram Bergson, The Structure of Soviet Wages, Harvard University
Press, 1946, Chaps. 13 and 14.
18JosephStalin, Problems of Leninism, Moscow, Foreign Languages Pub-
lishing House, 1940, pp. 371-373.
'°Bergson,The Structure of Soviet Wages, as cited.
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most every year of the period;20 by 1930 it amounted to about 50
per cent of household income.21 Clearly, Soviet dierential wage
policy was in danger of being weakened by Soviet tax policy. Re-
liance upon income taxation under these circumstances would have
had a much more adverse impact on the incentive-wage system than
commodity taxation for at least two reasons. First, under the Soviet
pay-as-you-earn system of income taxation, workers are as likely
to base job decisions on differential take-home pay as on gross wage
differentials. On the other hand, if no income tax were levied, gross
wage differentials would probably retain much of their incentive
effect, even with high levels of commodity taxation. Second, for
political reasons income taxation would almost necessarily have to
be progressive, or at least proportional, thereby reducing wage
differentials relatively as well as absolutely; this would not neces-
sarily be so for sales taxation, especially when the tax is hidden,
and when it has a highly differentiated rate structure, as is the case
in the Soviet Union.22 This facet of the money illusion is undoubtedly
an important reason for Soviet use of commodity taxation.
A second factor explaining Soviet reliance on commodity taxation
is administrative in nature. The turnover tax, particularly in the
early stages of its development, was levied on and collected from
state industrial enterprises (procurement agencies in agriculture)
and wholesale organizations. This provided the cheapest and least
evadable method of collecting money taxes from the population since
the number of industrial enterprises and wholesale organizations was
not large and they maintained relatively good money accounts; it
also provided a continuous source of funds—the larger enterprises
made daily payments to the budget. These considerations were quite
crucial in the late 1920's and the early 1930's, before the administra-
tive apparatus of the state had achieved anything like its present-day
efficiency. Reliance upon income taxation would have meant levy-
ing and collecting taxes from SO to 40 million householders, many
of whom were still illiterate. Furthennore, at that time a large seg-
ment of the peasant population still had not been herded into col-
20 Cf. Holzman, op. cit., Table 3. 21 Ibid., Table 3.
22 The Soviet turnover tax appears to have had a somewhat regressive rate
structure in the prewar period; the potwar structure seems to be considerably
less regressive and may be roughly proportional. The rate structure is much
too complex, and the information on income-expenditure patterns much too
limited, for us to come to any but the most tentative conclusions on this matter,
however. Cf. F. D. Holzman, Soviet Taxation: The Fiscal and Monetary Prob-
lems of a Planned Economy, Harvard University Press, 1955, Chap. 6.
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lective farms, where it could be reached without excessive, costs by
tax collectors.
A third consideration, and one which is stressed by Soviet econ-
omists, is the use of the turnover tax to facilitate price planning. The
Soviets have attempted to maintain a market for consumer goods
in which free choice prevails. Prices are not set freely by decen-
tralized agents as is usually the case in Western nations; rather,
prices are centrally administered and the state is responsible for
adjusting relative prices. Maintenance of appropriate price flexi-
bility is, for obvious reasons, facilitated by the existence Of a large
element of tax in the cost-price structure. In fact, without either a
commodity tax or a subsidy (which can be considered a negative
commodity tax in this case) it would not be possible to alter rela-
tive prices much faster than relative changes in productivity would
permit23 (i.e. prices would approximate long-run cost).
INCOME TAXATION
In spite of the advantages and magnitude of Soviet commodity
taxation, the population is also required to pay an income tax. The
only significant function which this tax seems to serve is to discourage
private practice by professionals24 (e.g. doctors and lawyers) and
other "nonworker" elements in the urban population. These groups
pay a discriminatorily high tax, which reaches 55 and 65 per cent,
respectively, on incomes in excess of 70,000 rubles; workers and
salaried employees, who comprise 90 per cent or more of the non-
agricultural labor force, pay according to a schedule which reaches
a maximum rate of 13 per cent on all income over 12,000 rubles
annually. While the "class policy" feature of the income tax may
have been important twenty years ago, before the private sector
of the economy had been thoroughly squelched, it can hardly be
considered so any more. Moreover, the tax certainly has little fiscal
importance.25 It is difficult to understand why the Soviets continue
to use direct levies on income when they could be replaced very
easily by a small increase in commodity taxation. Perhaps they are
continued through inertia, or because the Soviets wish to maintain
intact the direct tax apparatus for possible future use.
23 This is especially true since the Soviets have virtually no explicit rent
payments but include them implicitly in the turnover tax.
24 Also perhaps to extract the "economic rent" from such practices.
25 Whaf we have said of the urban income tax applies also to the agricultural
tax. The agricultural tax discriminates against the private farmer and in favor
of the collective farmer.
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SALES OF GOVEBNMENT BONDS
Sales of government bonds constitute, in effect, another form of
direct levy on the Soviet population. Similarity of these bond sales
to taxation rests on the following characteristics: considerable social
pressure is brought to bear upon the population to subscribe from
two to four weeks' wages a year; these amounts are deducted from
workers' wages every month just as direct taxes are; most bonds are
not redeemable until the full term has expired;26 a series of con-
versions (1930, 1936, 1938) and the 1947 Currency Reform have
together resulted in extended maturities, reduced interest rates, and
a reduction by two-thirds, in 1947, of the value of all outstanding
obligations; rapidly rising prices have steadily reduced the real
value of these highly ihiquid assets. The disadvantages of direct
taxes, in general, seem to apply to sales of bonds also, although bond
sales in the late 1920's may have been more "voluntary" in nature.
To the extent that they were (are) voluntary, disincentive effects
would, of course, have been (be) reduced.
Since the Currency Reform of 1947, consumer goods prices have
declined steadily. If this trend should be continued, the usefulness
of bonds as a form of taxation will have been substantially reduced.
On the one hand, falling price levels will cause the real rate of
interest on the bonds to exceed the nominal rate so that, in time,
repayment may become a real burden on the current Soviet budget.
Before 1947 the real rate of interest was undoubtedly negative due
to continuous inflation—the burden of repayment was insignificant.27
On the other hand, it seems doubtful that price levels wifi fall
rapidly enough to increase voluntary savings, especially in the
form of illiquid bonds, to the amount of the annual issue of bonds.
Thus, as prices fall the disadvantage of larger "real" repayments
would seem to more than offset the advantage of smaller disincen-
tive effects as the bonds become a slightly less unattractive form
of investment.
26 Lottery winners have their bonds redeemed at the same time they reeive
their lottery prizes. At present, one-third of the subscribers to a bond issue
eventually win lottery prizes.
27 Of course, very few bonds were ever actually paid off: the conversions
put off repayments in the 1930's and the currency reform of 1947 eliminated the
need for repayment on two-thirds of all outstanding obligations. However, even
if there had been no conversions, the real value of ten-year bonds at maturity
could hardly ever have amounted to more than about one-quarter of original
value, so rapid was the rise in consumer goods prices in the pre-1948 period.
Cf. Naum Jasny, The Soviet Economy during the Plan Era, Stanford• University
Press, 1951, p. 58.
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RETAINED PROFITS
Funds for investment are also available in the form of retained
profits accumulated by both state enterprises and collective farms.28
The annual plans usually call for a substantial part of the invest-
ment in the fixed and working capital of established state enterprises
to come out of the retained profits of these enterprises. State enter-
prises also receive grants from the budget for the same purpose. It
is difficult to understand what difference, if any, there is between
these two methods of finance, and why the Soviets do not concen-
trate on either one or the other. It is frequently contended that
managerial incentives are sharpened if managers are allowed 'to
finance investment from retained profits rather than by budget
subsidy. There is the implication in the case of retained profits that,
if the manager is more (less) efficient, he may have more (less)
funds to invest because profits will be larger (smaller). This implica-
tion does not square with the usual conception of an enterprise's
fulfilling its investment plan from retained profits and then auto-
matically transferring the remainder, after deductions into the
Directors' Fund, into the budget.20 Part of the Directors' Fund is,
of course, used for extra-plan investment; but the incentive to in-
crease profits by reducing costs and increasing output exists regard-
less of whether the enterprise has its own profits to begin with or
receives a budget subsidy.3° Soviet preference for budget-financed
investment probably lies in the greater administrative flexibility
which this 'method ma, confer; it is, undoubtedly, simpler to alter
investment plans in the short run if funds are doled out from the
budget than if they are accumulated by enterprises in which the
investment is planned.
The collective farms (and other cooperatives) not nationalized
and the property Of the state (though under strict state control, of
course) must meet the bulk of their investment requirements from
their own resources. The farms are required by law to withhold
28 This is also true of the consumer and producer cooperatives, but the
amounts have never been significant.
29 More often than not, the retained profit of a group of enterprises has been
redistributed among them for investment purposes by the administrative head
of the group (or gavk, translated "chief administration"). Recently, the power
of the glavk to do this was reduced. Cf. New York Tines, August 14, 1952,
article by Harry Schwartz.
80 This is because the bulk of the deduction into the Directors' Fund is based
on overplan profits, and a firm which reduced planned losses by a certain amount
would be considered to have exceeded the plan in the same direction as one
which increased positive profits.
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from 12 to 20 per cent of their total net money income (after
meeting costs of pioduction, excluding payments to labor) in a so-
called "indivisible fund" which is to be used for capital invest-
ment.3' Most of the current money income of the collectives is, of
course, distributed among the collective farmers in payment for
their labor. Investment by the collective farms (except in kind) has
never amounted to much because most of their machinery require-
ments (tractors, combines, etc.) are met, for a price, by the state-
owned machine tractor stations (MTS). The MTS have been since
1938 included in the budget on a gross basis; all of their expendi-
tures, including new investment, are financed by budget subsidy.
Collective farms with insufficient funds to finance their investment
requirements can borrow small sums from the Agricultural Bank.
FUND FOR AMORTIZATION
Most economic organizations which use capital equipment are
required to consider depreciation a cost of production and to main-
tain depreciation reserves. Western economists generally consider
that these reserves understate depreciation in view of the extensive
Soviet cost inflation, because of the fact that original rather than
replacement cost is used in computing depreciation, and because
inexpert handling of equipment appears to be widespread and may
have had the effect of reducing the physical life of much equipment.
Originally, the reserves were devoted exclusively to replacing old,
and constructing new, equipment. Since 1938, part of these funds
have been made available for capital repair.
MINOR SOuRcES OF BUDGET RECEIPTS
The more important sources of budget revenue have already been.
noted: turnover tax, deductions from profits of state enterprises, the
social insurance markup, direct taxes on the population, and sales
of government bonds. The budget derives revenue from many other
sources. Customs are, perhaps, the most important of these. In the
prewar period they amounted to as much as 2 per cent of total
budget receipts in some years. During the war, receipts from tariffs
on regular imports were strongly supplemented by local currency
resulting from lend-lease sales; since the war, regular receipts have
Receipts from sale of surplus property or livestock are also deposited in
the "indivisible fund." Initially, this fund is based on the value of the property
and money payments of the collective farmers to the collective farm at the
time the farm is organized.
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been supplemented by reparations. Other sources are an inheritance
tax which at present is simply a fee for the processing of legal docu-
ments, fees for commercial forestry and fishing, fines, licenses, the
gross receipts of the machine tractor stations, and taxes on the
profits of the collective farms and other cooperatives. Taken individ-
ually, these items do not generally provide much revenue; in the
aggregate, however, their contribution is not insubstantial.
THE STATE BANK: CHANGES IN CURRENCY IN CIRCULATION
A substantial share of the working capital requirements of the
economy are financed by the State Bank (Gosbank) in the form
of short-term loans. In the early 1930's, when the basis of the
present Soviet banking system was established, the Bank was given
authority to extend short-term credit to finance goods in transit,
seasonal production processes and expenses, and other temporary
working capital needs connected with the production and turnover
of goods.32 Permanent working capital was to be furnished to new
enterprises needing it by the budget in the form of interest-free
grants; additions to permanent working capital were to be financed
either by the budget or out of the retained profits of the enterprises.
If the working capital needs of enterprises had been seasonally
stable, there would have been no necessity, in the original Soviet
scheme of things, for the short-term credit operations of the State
Bank. "The function of short-term credit in the Soviet economy.
[was], broadly speaking, to level out fluctuation in the flow of
materials and goods."3' The functions of the State Bank were ex-
tended in the mid-1930's, however, when it was authorized to finance
a large percentage of the permanent working capital requirements
of trade organizations; and again in 1939 when it was assigred the
task of regularly financing part of the permanent working capital
needs of heavy industry. This deviation from the original principle
which guided the granting of short-term credit was introduced with
the purpose of giving the State Bank control over the activities of
enterprises in these sectors.'4 Apparently, these enterprises "experi-
32Cf.Alexander Baykov, The Development of the Soviet Economic System,
London, Cambridge University Press, 1948, P. 404. 'L.E. Hubbard, Soviet Money and Finance, London, Macmillan, 1936,
p. 228.'Thisrefers to the well-known "control by the ruble." That is to say, b
making state enterprises dependent upon the State Bank for funds, the Ban
is placed in a position in which it can supervise and check the progress of
enterprises, and put pressure on enterprises which are not operating satisfactorily
or according to plan.
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encedlittle variation in working capital requirements, and thus were
able to escape the control and supervisory functions of the Gos-
bank."35 This is the situation at present; it should be noted, however,
that during the war the Bank was authorized to advance large credits
for the reconstruction of enterprises in liberated areas, to make pay-
ments to military personnel under certain special conditions, to
facilitate the evacuation of industries eastward during the German
advance, and to meet other extraordinary needs. Presumably, credit
is no longer granted for these special purposes.
It is important to note that the State Bank is, in normal times,
the onlysourceof currency issue in the U.S.S.R. With the exception
of the years 1941-1943—years of great internal disruption, when the
budget ran deficits which were financed by currency issue—short-
term loans to finance the above-noted working capital needs of
enterprise have been the sole source of new currency in circulation.
The extension of new short-term loans does not always, or usually,
lead to a currency increment, however. New currency is issued to
finance short-term loans only if no currency is returned by the popu-
lation from other sources. Other sources of funds are excesses of
budget receipts over budget expenditures, of retained profits over
investment financed from retained profits, of depreciation reserves
over expenditures from depreciation reserves, etc. These funds and
others mentioned above are all reflected in the accounts of the State
Bank either by direct deposit or indirectly through the deposit in
the State Bank of the reserves of the special banks for long-term
investment (see below). To the extent that currency receipts in the
State Bank are greater than expenditures (including long-term loans)
from these receipts, new short-term credit can be extended with-
out the issuance of currency; in fact, if there should be a surplus of.
deposits over expenditures, including short-term loans, currency will
be withdrawn from circulation. If, on the other hand, expenditures,
including short-term loans, exceed receipts, new currency iscir-
culated. If, therefore, we were interested in measuring the amount
of Soviet nonconsumption expenditures (as we are below) from
sources of finance, we would not include gross changes in the amount
of short-term credit outstanding; this would involve a double count
because bank loans are an expenditure item in the national financial
accounts. We simply add (subtract) increases (decreases) in cur-
Gregory Grossman, "The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics," in Com-
parative Banking Systems, B. H. Beckhart, editor, Columbia University Press,
1954, pp. 733-768.
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rency in circulation. To clarify this point, an estimate of Soviet
financial accounts for 1936 is presented in Table 2.
TABLE 2
Estimate of Soviet National Financial Accounts, 1936
(billions of rubles)
Receipts Expenditures
1. Budget receipts (including 1. Budget expenditures 92.5k
bonds) 94.42. Investment and other expendi-
2. Retained profits tures financed outside budget
a. State enterprises 8.9 a. From retained profits
b. Collective farms 1.5 i. State enterprises 8.9b
c. Others ii. Others 2.6c
3. Depreciation reserves 4.9 b. Depreciation
c. Net increase in short-term
credit (State Bank) 8.1
d. Long-term loans to collec-
tive farms and farmers j.51
Subtotal 109.7
4. Currency issue 1.6 Subtotal 113.6
5. Discrepancy 2.33. Currency withdrawal 0
Total 113.8 Total 113.6
Figures for which sources are not cited were taken from tables later in this
chapter.
"Same source as budget receipts.
bPlannedinvestment in fixed capital from S. N. Prokopovich, Biulleten',
March 1936, No. 127, p. 30. Planned investment in working capital from C. F.
Grinko, Financial Program of the U.S.S.R. for 1936, Moscow, Foreign Languages
Publishing House, 1936, p. 15.
CAtleast 2.6 billion rubles of other investment from profits can be estimated
from A. Smilga, "Finansy sotsialisticheskogo gosudarstvo" ("Finances of Socialist
State"), Problemy ekonomiki (Problems of Economics), 1937, No. 2, p. 115.
dK.Plotnikov, Biudzhet sotsialisticheskogo gosudarstva(Budget of the
Socialist States), Moscow, p. 140.
It would hardly be necessary to discuss the special banks for
long-term investment had they not been misnamed banks. Their
primary function is to disburse and supervise the use of funds
previously collected rather than to create new credit. The bulk of
these funds are budgetary grants to enterprises in the national econ-
omy for investment in plant and equipment and working capital.
Other funds held and disbursed by these banks are retained profits
of state enterprises, the indivisible fund, retained profits of other
cooperatives, and that part of the reserves for depreciation used
to finance new investment.36 Apparently, the special banks "lend"
to both individuals and enterprises, but the amounts involved are
36Thepart used for capital repair is deposited in the State Bank.
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notsignificant and will be ignored here except for long-term loans
by the Agriculture Bank to collective farms. The special banks keep
their excess funds on deposit with the State Bank; thus the State
Bank is seen to be the custodian of excess investment funds for
virtually the whole Soviet economy. Long-term loans of the special
banks, like short-term loans, are expenditure, not receipt, items in
Soviet financial accounts; they are reflected in "sources of finance"
only insofar as they affect the amount of currency which has to be
circulated by the State Bank to financeitsshort-term credit
operations.
TAXATION IN KIND
No mention has been made so far of taxation in kind of agricul-
ture because it does not directly provide the state with monetary
reserves for financing nonconsumption expenditures; indirectly, how-
ever, it does. The tax in kind takes the form of compulsory deliveries
of agricultural products by collective farms and peasant farmers to
state and cooperative procurement agencies. While the farms and
peasants are not uncompensated for their deliveries, the price paid
by the state (called procurement price) is usually far from sufficient
to cover costs of production; and, of course, it is only a fraction of
the retail price (minus processing and distribution costs) at which
the state resells these items to the population. The high retail price
is achieved by superimposing a turnover tax on procurement price
plus costs of processing and distribution. The portion of the turnover
tax collected by virtue of the below-cost procurement price is the
monetary equivalent of the tax in kind on that part of the compulsory
deliveries sold to the household.a7 Delivered produce not sold back
to the household (e.g. stockpiled or used in the production of final
products not sold to the household) is not reflected in the budget
and may be classified as "investment in kind" by the state.
This classification holds in all circumstances in which producing
agents are directly paid less than cost of production or less than
the value of their product (or not at all). A major case in point is,
of course, that of unfree labor in the Soviet Union. The evidence
indicates that workers in this category are remunerated at less than
87fthe procurement price of a bushel of grain which cost 40 rubles to
produce were only 20 rubles and the state resold the grain (as bread) for 100
rubles, the turnover tax on a bushel would be 80 rubles, of which it could be
said that 20 rubles (40 minus 20) was paid by the producer and 60 (100
minus 40) by the consmner.
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the free market wage for comparable performance.88 To the extent
that the products of unfree labor are sold to the population at high
prices and add to the, receipts of the turnover tax, the tax in kind
on unfree labor (in the form of below-market wage payments) is
reflected in budgetary receipts. To the extent that the services of
these laborers are directed into nOnconsumption activities such as
gold mining, construction, irrigation projects, and the building of
dams and roads (and these are the sorts of activities typically
handled by the MVD), they may be classed as investment in kind
by the state.
It should be noted that there is still another important source
of investment in kind in the Soviet Union. We refer to that part of
the income in kind of the agricultural sector of the economy which
is neither taxed away by the state nor consumed by peasant house-
holds, but which is devoted to the following years' production (e.g.
seed, feed, stockpiles, increasing livestock herds). Needless to say,
none of the above categories of investment in kind are readily suscep-
tible to measurement; nor can we, for that matter, even say what
part of the turnover tax is a tax on the consumer and what part is
a tax on the agricultural producer.89
How is Soviet preference for taxation in kind of agriculture to
be explained? Basically, the difference between taxation of industrial
income and taxation of agricultural income stems from the fact
that industry and the output of industry are almost 100 per cent
state-owned, while agriculture consists primarily of collective farms,
which are not owned by the state, and of individual peasant farm-
ers.40 This form of organization of agriculture, rather than state-
owned farms with the farmers receiving wages, creates two serious
problems for the state. First, the state must secure by some means
a substantial share of the output of the agricultural sector to be
transferred to the city for personal and industrial consumption and
for export. Taxation of the money incomes of agricultural producers
would not necessarily secure this result: if the amount of the tax
were calculated on the basis of actual money income, the peasants
38Bergson,in his famous study of Soviet wages, demonstrated that relative
wages in the Soviet Union appear to reflect relative differences in productivity
(cf. Bergson, The Structure of Soviet Wages, as cited, pp. 207-209). On this
basis one can take the free-market wage for a particular job as a rough measure
of the value of the job performance to the state.
This separation is attempted for grains, on the basis of heroic assumptions,
in Holzman, Soviet Taxation, as cited, Chap. 7.
40Thesovkhozy, or state farms, are owned by the state but produce a very
small percentage of total agricultural output.
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could reduce their money income, hence tax payments, by cutting
down sales of agricultural output; even if taxable income were based
on production, the peasants could, by cutting back on their con-
sumption of industrial consumer goods, still avoid the necessity of
having to sell as much agricultural output as the state needed to
meet its requirements. These are not idle possibilities in a country
where adequately feeding the population has been—and will con-
tinue to be, barring unforeseen developments—a very serious eco-
nomic problem. By means of money taxation, alone, it might prove
impossible to reduce the food consumption of the peasants below
a level consistent with the needs of the nation as 'a whole for food.
Second, as we have seen, for incentive and other reasons the state
collects most of its budget receipts in the form of indirect taxes.
Since the bulk of the turnover tax, the major indirect tax, is col-
lected in the form of a markup on agricultural products (because
food is the principal item of personal consumption in the Soviet
Union), the incidence of the turnover tax on the agricultural popu-
lation considered as consumers is relatively small because a large
part of its income takes the form of consumption of home-produced
food. Another form of tax on the peasantry must be substituted for
indirect money taxation if a high rate of saving for the economy as
a whole is to be maintained. The tax in kind solves these two prob-
lems at once for the state: it insures state procurement of the required
amount of agricultural produce, and it forces a high level of savings
upon the agricultural population.
2. Trends in Sources of Finance
Financial data covering the first three Five-Year Plan periods
(1928/1929-1940) are presented in Table 8. Before analyzing the
data, three explanatory (methodological) comments are in order.
COMMENTS ON METHODOLOGY
First, the various indirect taxes and retained profits of state
enterprises, as presented by Soviet sources, must be adjusted be-
cause a part of these taxes are levied on commodities which are not
purchased by the population (e.g. tanks and food purchased by
the armed forces) but are purchased by state enterprises and or-
ganizations for final use. To the extent that taxes levied by the state
serve simply to pay other taxes levied by the state, the transaction
is appropriately viewed as a pure transfer payment within the state
sector, and not as a purchase of goods or services. The turnover tax
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requires relatively little adjustment because it is levied primarily
on goods purchased by the household. The profits tax, social in-
surance markup, other indirect taxes, and retained profits of enter-
prises require a more substantial reduction because the incidence of
these categories on producer goods and raw materials is somewhat
heavier. No precision can be claimed for this adjustment, though
breakdowns of some of the above taxes by ministries (commissariats)
and in some cases by commodities facilitated the estimates.41 The
deduction of indirect taxes from the value of goods and services
purchased by the state yields results which approximate factor cost
rather than market price valuation.'
Second, an important expenditure on budget account is subsi-
dies. For our purposes, subsidies can be classified under two head-
ings: payments to enterprises in the national economy which operate
at a loss, primarily those in the extractive and producer goods
industries, and payments to the machine tractor stations, which, at
least since 1938 when they were placed in the budget on a gross
basis, have not earned enough to pay their way.43 To the extent
that subsidies serve to lower the price of goods purchased for final
consumption by the state, they do not affect the validity of our figures.
True, the state pays a below-cost price for commodities purchased
—but the reduced price is largely offset by the subsidy payment. As
in the case of commodity taxes on producer goods, mentioned above,
these subsidies represent a transfer within the state sector of the
economy. To the extent, however, that subsidies reduce the cost
of consumer goods and services, they affect the validity of our
data as a measure of the funds available for investment because they
reduce the amount of taxes (as shown by the budget) actually avail-
able to finance nonconsumption expenditures. That is to say, sub-
sidies which lower the cost of consumer goods can be looked upon,
for our purposes, as a reduction in the net taxes on the population.
Most of the consumer subsidies are a result of the subsidy to the
Cf. Appendix, notes to Table 3.
42Thereare still many deviations from factor cost valuation, however, al-
though indirect taxes are the worst offenders. There are also subsidies (to be
mentioned below) and valuation of the tax in kind (see above), to list but
two of the most important.
This is due primarily to the fact that their receipts in kind (and most
of the payments for services rendered to collective farms are in kind) are
valued, for budgetary accounting purposes, at the very low procurement prices
—the same prices the peasants themselves receive from the state in return
for obligatory deliveries. If these deliveries were valued at cost, or at retail



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: See Appendix, Notes to Table 3.
machine tractor stations, although part of this subsidy, no doubt,
also affects the price of goods purchased by the state. The cost of
consumer goods is also reduced by subsidies to the producer goods
and extractive industries, insofar as the products of these industries
(e.g. fuel) are used eventually in the production of consumer goods;
but the subsidy to the consumer from this source is not likely to
amount to much.
No adjustment for the subsidy to consumer goods products will
be made here, however, for three reasons: the adjustment is not
very large; the data are sufficient to make rough estimates for only
the last three years of the period under observation; undervaluation
of MTS receipts in kind, mentioned in the preceding footnote, may
all but eliminate the subsidy, in real terms, to the MTS.44
Third, the Soviets do not have explicit cost categories which
correspond to the Western categories of interest as the cost of
capital, rent as the return to land, and profits as the return for
exceptional entrepreneurial ability.4 Furthermore, as we have noted,
depreciation is understated; and neither depletion nor obsolescence
is explicitly considered a cost. In some cases Soviet economists have
indicated that these costs are implicitig covered by commodity tax
payments. Thus the large turnover tax on petroleum and petroleum
products is considered by Soviet economists to reflect the large
differential rent earned by the industry and to substitute for ex-
plicit rent payments.46 In general, however, the missing factor costs
are not earmarked at all and there does not appear to be any
44 For those interested the adjustment has been attempted elsewhere: cf.
Holzman, "The Burden of Soviet Taxation," as cited.
Some exceptions are the following: persons living in apartment houses in
the cities pay nominal rent; interest is charged on short-term loans from the
State Bank; and some payments for exceptional entrepreneurial ability are
made out of the Directors' Fund and in the form of premiums for managers
whose plants fulfill or overfulfihl output plans.
46"Tothe extent that differential rent does not receive independent ex-
pression in all branches of the national economy ... rentis paid in the form
of the turnover tax." A. Cordin, "Ekonomicheskoe znachenie sistemy oblozheniia
p0 oborotu" ("Economic Significance of the Turnover Tax System"), Sovetskie
finansy (Soviet Finance), 1947, No. 8, p. 12.
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satisfactory way of estimating them. Our estimates (below) of the
"true" value (in the Western sense) of Soviet nonconsumption ex-
penclitures are for this reason understated. It appears unlikely, how-
ever, that the understatement is large4s or that it seriously affects
the estimates in this paper.
TRENDS IN SOURCES OF FiNANcE
Let us turn now to an examination of the data. From 1928/1929 to
1940, the twelve years under consideration, the total funds raised
for expenditures on investment, defense, health, education, transfer
payments, etc., rose from 11.8 billion rubles to 173.9 billion rubles—
a fifteenfold increase. With the exception of the years 1933 and
1989, the annual percentage increases fall into three groups: roughly
50 per cent from 1928/1929 to 1982, 25 per cent from 1933 to 1936,
and about 15 per cent from 1936 to 1940. The increases in each
period reflect three factors: growth of national output, cost (price)
inflation, and growth of the state industrial and collective farm
economies at the expense of the private enterprise economy. The
exceptional increase in the years of the first Five-Year Plan is
probably largely a result of the swift "liquidation" of the private
economy in those years. Cost inflation, which plagued the Soviets
unremittingly from 1928 to 1986, appears to have slackened some-
what from 1937 to 1940; this may explain the dampened increase in
total sources of finance in this latter period. As a very rough approxi-
mation, the inflationary element in the increase in Soviet sources of
finance can be eliminated by using the average wage rate as a de-
flator.49 The results indicate that the "real" increase in nonconsump-
tion expenditures by the state, due to liquidation of the private
economy and to the real growth of national output, was, as a mini-
mum, about 100 per cent in the first FYP period and 200 per cent
Some writers assume that these factor costs are represented by profits of
state enterprises(e.g. Paul Baran, "National Income and Product of the
U.S.S.R. in 1940," Review of Economic Statistics, November 1947, pp. 226-
233). There is no indication that retained profits are of the correct magnitude
to represent the missing factor costs; and although the magnitude may be
appropriate for a given year, by coincidence, its arbitrary variation over time
would cast doubt upon its usefulness for a series of years.
48Cf.D. R. Hodgman, "A New Index of Soviet Industrial Production,"
Review of Economics and Statistics, November 1950, p. 335.
49Thiswould only account for expenditures on industrial commodities. The
cost to the state of agricultural commodities is the "procurement price"—and
we have no index of such prices. The average wage rate actually gives us
a minimum deflator for industrial goods because to the extent that productivity
increased, the wage rate is too large a deflator (cf. footnote 50).
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from 1928/1929 to 194Q.° The estimated increase from 1982 to 1936
is amazingly small, about 15 per cent; this undoubtedly reflects the
inadequacies of our deflator, however—Soviet increases in industrial
productivity in this period are generally believed to have been quite
large.'
The various sources of finance are presented in Table 4 as per-
centages of the total.52 The outstanding trend here is the rapid
growth of the major indirect taxes. In a period of five or six years
these taxes double in relative importance and bear about two-thirds
of the burden of the state's financial requirements. The trends in
direct taxes on the population and retained profits of state enter-
prises are in the opposite direction. In absolute figures, direct taxes
do not decline—in fact, they increase slightly. But with total financial
requirements increasing rapidly and being satisfied from other
sources, the relative importance of direct taxes is reduced.
The decline in the relative importance of profits of state enter-
prises from 1928/1929 to 1935 is somewhat more dramatic. My
guess is that with the beginning of the First FYP and the greater
centralization of decision-making which this entailed, it was de-
cided that funds for investment in industry would be more fluid
and more easily controlled if first deducted into the budget and then
° These are the figures:
1928/1929or19291932 1936 1940
1.Source of finance, index 100 361 820 1,539
2. Average annual wage, index 100 178 357 509
Line 1 ÷ line 2 100 203 230 302
Source of wage figures: For 1929 and 1932, Socialist Construction of the
U.S.S.R., Moscow, 1936, pp. 368-369; and for 1936 and 1940, Abram Bergson,
"A Problem in Soviet Statistics," Review of Economic Statistics, November
1947, P. 236.
To adjust for changes in productivity, it would be necessary to deflate the
wage index by the increase in productivity. Thus if productivity had doubled
by 1940 in all of the activities financed by the Soviet government, then the
adjusted deflator for 1940 would be 509 --2,or 255; the real increase in
government activity would correspondingly rise from 302 to 604. For an indica-
tion of the increase in Soviet industrial productivity in the prewar period see
Walter Galenson, "Industrial Labor Productivity," in Soviet Economic Growth,
Abram Bergson, editor, Row, Peterson, 1953. See also comments by Joseph
Berliner regarding overhead personnel, ibid., pp. 215-221.
' See Galenson, op. cit., pp. 195 and 196.
52 The various items do not add up to 100 per cent, however. Forreasons
mentioned earlier, the total is obtained by including only Bank loans financed
by new cun'ency; here we included the total of new loans by the banks re-
gardless of whether they were financed by new currency, budgetary surplus,
or some other source of excess funds because of our interest in the extent of















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































redirected in the economy, than if invested directly by enterprises
earning profits. In 1986, retained profits almost doubled in relative
importance as the Soviets reduced subsidies to industry and in-
creased the amount to be invested from retained profits with the
avowed purpose of improving managerial incentives. This effort
appears to have lost momentum in the years immediately following.54
The trend in bond sales to the population parallels that of direct
taxation with the exception of 1928/1929 and 1929/1980, when the
Soviets first began to tap this source of revenue.
The short-term working capital loans of the State Bank follow
a more erratic course than any other category listed. The direction
of change is altered seven times in twelve years, and most of the
changes are large and involve either a "doubling" or a "halving" in
the relative importance of these loans from one year to the next.
The only consistent trend is the downward swing from 1935 to 1989,
and this may be explained as part of the general anti-inflationary
policy followed in those years. The increase in 1940, however, was
probably due to the decision in 1939 to finance with State Bank
credit part of the permanent working capital needs of heavy indus-
try. No explanation is offered for the zigzag path of State Bank
loans from 1981 to 1935. The increase from 1928/1929 to 1931 re-
flects the pursuance of a relatively wide-open credit policy; in fact,
so leniently was credit granted in these years that state enterprises
were forced to default in 1981 and 1932 on the repayment of more
than one-third of the outstanding short-term debt.55
Not only was short-term credit on the increase during the First
Five-Year Plan period, but it was to a considerable extent financed
by increases in cash currency. In fact, the total increase in currency
53 During and shortly after World War ix,retained profits declined to
virtually nothing, presumably for the same reason. In 1947, retained profits
totaled 1.5 billion rubles, which was less than .5 per cent of the budget receipts
for that year.
Another attempt at reducing subsidies and increasing investment from
retained profits was made in 1949.
This problem was solved by converting the short-term debt to long-term
debt (see Appendix, notes to Table 3).
The rapid increase in credit has been ascribed by Hubbard to failure to
carry out the spirit of the credit reform of January 1930. This neglect "led
to the automatic issue of bank credit and relieved state enterprises of any
urgent necessity to regulate their finances, with the result that the Cosbank
practically went over from a system of granting credits repayable at a fixed
maturity to granting nonrepayable loans. Enterprises, therefore, ignored their
financial position and that of their own clients, and undertook liabilities which
they had little or no prospect of meeting." Cf. Hubbard, op. cit., p. 18. Quoted
by permission.
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in circulation for the years 1928/1929, 1929/1930, and 1932 was
5.1 billion rubIes while the total increase in short-term credit out-
standing was only 4.9 billion rubles (see Table 3); the increase
in currency in circulation in 1931 was also large, though not com-
parable to the increase in short-term credit in that year. New cur-
rency in circulation constituted between 5 and 10 per cent of total
sources of finance from 1928/1929 to 1932, a very large amount in-
deed. Thereafter the importance of new currency declined. In 1933
the amount of currency in circulation actually declined by almost
25 per cent, the result of a very large budget surplus in that year.
As one would expect, 1933 was a relatively deflationary year: wage
inflation slowed from a gallop to a trot (see Table 6) and repressed
inflation was substantially reduced. From 1934 to 1939, currency in
circulation continued to increase but occupied a relatively minor
role among total sources of finance.56
Of the remaining sources of finance, the depreciation reserve is
the only one which is important. With the exception of 1928/1929,
this reserve remained a fairly constant percentage of total sources
of finance in the prewar period. Voluntary household savings pur-
sued an erratic course and, on the average, amounted to only about
1 per cent of the total savings of the economy. Funds for investment
in the collective farms (both sources) were likewise small; because
the machine tractor stations were owned and financed by the state,
the investment requirements of the collectives were not very great.
Furthermore, part of their investment requirements are met "in kind"
in the form of so-called "seed funds" and "feed funds" and of col-
lective farm labor mobilized to perform special tasks.
It would have been a large gap indeed if in this paper the estimates
of Soviet sources of finance could not have been related to the
total income (output) of the nation. To draw up a reliable estimate
of Soviet national income even for one year, however, is a major
task in itself; to draw up reliable estimates for every year of the
period under discussion would have required years of research. For
purposes of this paper a compromise is offered: a rather crude
"modified" gross national product series is estimated for the years
1928/1929 to 1940. Gross national product is calculated as the sum
of two major components—government (plus collective farm) ex-
56 Thevelocityof circulation was increasing in this period so that given in-
crements to currency in circulation were becoming more and more inflationary.
For .data on velocity see Raymond P. Powell, "Soviet Monetary Policy," doctoral
dissertation, University of California, 1952, p. 193.
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penditures and household expenditures—and all estimates are net of
indirect taxes.57
Our modified gross national product series is presented in Table
5. Two versions of the breakdown between government and house-
hold are presented. In the first, government expenditures include
expenditures on health and education—the bulk of these are, in fact,
purchased by the government and made available to the household
as free services. Since, however, the household (qua household)
actually consumes these services,58 a second breakdown (between
government consumption and household consumption) is presented,
in which expenditures on health and education are deducted from
government expenditures and added to household expenditures.59
The importance of the government sector in the Soviet economy
is strikingly established by the percentage relationship between gov-
ernment expenditures and gross national output. With the exception
of the first year of the industrialization drive, 1928/1929, when eco-
nomic mobilization had not yet attained full momentum, and the
year 1933, when a strong attempt was made to stem the rising tide
of inflation, government expenditures consistently totaled from 60
to 65 per cent of gross national product. Government consumption,
though a somewhat smaller percentage of total product than gov-
ernment expenditures, is, nevertheless, also very impressive. On the
average it amounted to about 50 per cent of CNP, household con-
sumption constituting the other 50 per cent. In the year 1929/1930,
however, households consumed only 44 per cent of a rather small
national product; in the "good" years 1937 and 1938 households were
allocated 55 per cent of the marketed national output. Threat of
war was no doubt largely responsible for the decline in the share of
household consumption in 1939 and 1940.
The methods used to estimate Soviet gross national product and the serious
limitations of these estimates are set forth in detail in the Appendix, Notes to
Table 5. See also Table 5, footnote e.
58 it may be true that expenditures on education may include corn-
mijnist propaganda, scientific research (including atomic research), and other
things not consumed by the population, for reasons noted elsewhere (Holzman,
"The Burden of Soviet Taxation," as cited) I feel that these items do not con-
stitute a large part of the total. Expenditures on education and health also
include capital expenditures, but these are a small part of the total.
Military subsistence might also have been added to household consumption,
but reasonably reliable data were not available for most years. With the
exception of 1939-1940, this item was probably not very large. The term
consumption is here taken to mean the use or consumption of both consump-
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































3. Evaluation of Soviet Financial Policies
Three basic objectives of Soviet fiscal policy in the prewar period
were the following:
1. A falling price level in the market for consumers' goods. This
objective was included in each of the first three Five-Year Plans.
2. Maintenance of free choice in the market for consumers' goods.
This required, of course, the avoidance (elimination) of repressed
inflation since equitable distribution is impossible where "too much
money chases too few goods."6° Ever since the disastrous attempts
during War Communism (1918-1921) to do away with the use of
money, the Soviets have recognized and striven for free market
distribution of consumers' goods.
3. Maintenance of relatively stable or declining producer goods
prices. To this end, a system of subsidies was introduced to keep
down the prices of newly introduced producer goods until such
time as new techniques of production had been mastered and econ-
omies of scale achieved. Accomplishment of this objective required
accomplishment of a subsidiary objective: that increases in the
remuneration of factors of production (in this case, labor) not ex-
ceed, by much, increases in productivity. Comparison of Soviet wage
and productivity targets bears this out.61 Stability of producer goods
and raw materials prices obviously simplifies the planning process,
and this appears to have been the main reason for this. Soviet
objective.
A brief look at the economic history of the prewar period indicates
that, for the most part, the Soviets were unsuccessful in achieving
these financial goals. Consumer goods prices rose rapidly and
steadily throughout the entire period. Jasny estimates the cost of
living of urban workers to have risen 750 per cent from 1928 to 1937,
and 1,100 per cent by 1940.62 This is indeed rampant inflation. Pro-
80Equitabledistribution is used here to mean distribution in accordance
with differential earnings ("to each according to his labor"); and distribution
in accordance with differential earnings is an essential condition for the suc-
cessful operation of a labor market in which wage incentives are depended
upon for the economic allocation of labor. Economic allocation of labor by
market forces can be considered an aspect of objective 2 above.
61Inthe First FYI', for example, wages in large-sale industry were to in-
crease from 40.7 to 46.9 per cent while productivity (for a slightly different
coverage of industry—so-called VSNKh industry) was to increase from 85 to
110 per cent. Cf. Piatiletnii plan narodno—khoziaistvennogo stroitel'stta S.S.S.R.
(Five-Year Plan of National Economic Development), Moscow, 1930,pp. 190
and 192.
62Jasny,The Soviet Economy during the Plan Era, as cited, p. 69.
257HOLZMAN
ducer goods prices also rose, though much less rapidly than those of
consumer goods ,for three reasons: the prices of producer goods were
not inflated by the imposition of large (increasingly large) com-
modity taxes, loss-covering subsidies were disbursed on a profligate
scale, and productivity was increasing relatively rapidly. Neverthe-
less, by 1940, producer goods prices had risen, according to Jasny,
to about 250 to 350 per cent of the 1928 level.°3 The annual wage
rate rose on the average, as we have already noted, by about 500
per cent from 1928 to 1940; not even Soviet productivity estimates,
which are afflicted with the same upward bias as the industrial pro-
duction index, show a comparable increase over the same period.
Soviet performance was, perhaps, best in the case of repressed in-
flation. While repressed inflation was on the rise84 from 1928 to
1932, it declined steadily from 1988 to 1987;° rationing was dis-
continued in 1935-1936, and roughly uniform prices prevailed in all
markets in 1937 and 1938. There is evidence to indicate that some
repressed inflation developed again during the year 1940.66
Thus we have seen that while Soviet financial objectives were, on
the whole, noninflati6nary, inflation did, in fact, pervade the Soviet
economy in the prewar period. What does this imply about the
Soviet sources of finance analyzed in the previous sections? It
implies that Soviet financial policy was inflationary: that either the
short-term credit operations of the State Bank were too large, or,
if not too large, they were financed too little by budgetary and other
surpluses of receipts over expenditures and too much by the printing
of new currency. The amount of currency in circulation increased
from about 2 billion rubles in January 1929 to an estimated 16
billion in January 1941°7—an eightfold increase in twelve years.68
Sophisticated analysis is hardly required to indicate that this is a
very large increase and would, under most circumstances, be incom-
patible with monetary stability. That it was incompatible with Soviet
83Jasny,The Soviet Price System, as cited, Chap. 2.
64measuredby the spread between the prices in state stores and on the
free collective farm markets.
65Forcitations see Holzman, "The Burden of Soviet Taxation," as cited.
66IrvingB. Kravis and Joseph Mintzes report that shortages of many com-
modities developed in 1940 in government stores. See their "Food Prices in
the Soviet Union, 1936-50," RevIew of Economics and Statistics, May 1950,
pp. 185-166.
67Forsources and methods see Appendix, Notes to Table 3.
68Velocityof circulation was also increasing in this period. Cf. Powell, op.
cit., p. 193.
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monetary stability has been very ably demonstrated by Raymond
Powell in his doctoral dissertation.°9
It is useful, in analyzing Soviet inflation, to begin at the enterprise
level because excess liquidity first expresses itself in the Soviet
economy in the form of excess deposit balances available to managers
of enterprises. From their behavior it is quite clear that managers of
Soviet enterprises had available to them funds which were more than
adequate to meet their needs in the prewar period, in terms of labor,
raw materials, and other inputs at planned prices. Responsibility
for this high degree of liquidity must be attributed largely to the
disproportion mentioned above, between taxes and bank credit. The
effect of this excess liquidity was different in the markets for in-
dustrial raw materials and equipment, on the one hand, and the
labor market, on the other. Inflation in the raw materials and equip-
ment markets has always been repressed because prices are quite
rigidly controlled, as are allocations of important commodities. Re-
pressed inflation was manifest, as is typical in such situations, in the
hoarding by Soviet enterprises of everything they could get their
hands on which might be useful at some later date. To paraphrase a
Soviet economist: enterprises will refrain from using surplus funds
to buy supplies only when they are already "clearly and significantly
oversatiated."7°
The labor market in the 1930's constituted an important leak in
the system of direct controls over inflation in the enterprise sector.
The market for labor was relatively free, i.e. there was very little
direct allocation of labor and the wage rate was not very effectively
controlled. Managers used excess funds to compete for workers, and
this resulted in a rapid and continuous increase in wage rates
throughout the prewar period.71 The increases, it should be noted
(Table 0), were considerably over and above those planned by the
Soviet authorities.72
Ibid.
70 V. Batyrev, "Voprosy planirovanila privlechennykh resursov gosudarstven-
nogo banka" ("Problems of Planning the Liabilities of the State Bank"),
Dengi i kredit (Money and Credit), 1941, No. 1-2, P. 37.
11Italso resulted in a level of labor turnover in industry which averaged
about 100 per cent annually during the first two Five-Year Plan periods. See
Sotsialisticheskoe stroitel'stvo S.S.S.R. (Socialirt Construction of the U.S.S.R.),
as cited, p. 531.
12 The various techniques used by managers to avoid wage controls and the
unsuccessful attempts by the authorities (in the prewar period at least)to
prevent a bidding up of wage rates by State Bank control over the disbursal
of enterprise payroll funds are both described in detail elsewhere. Cf. Holzman,
Soviet Taxation, as cited, Chap. 2.
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a Thepercentage increase from the realized wage of one year to the planned
wage for the subsequent year.
b The increase of realized over planned wages for the same year.
cTheincreasefrom the realized figure of one year to the realized figure for
the subsequent year.
d This figure is for the year ending October 1, 1928.
The planned wage rate for 1931 is coupled (in the source) with a realized
figure for 1980 which differs from other realized figures in our series. Neverthe-
less, it is meaningful to use the figures which have been coupled, and this has
been done.
The unplanned increase may be too high because of the discrepancy men-
tioned in note e. That is to say, 941 rubles may be a somewhat iow wage rate
because it is based on a preliminary realized wage for 1930 which is too low.
Hence, the increase from 941 to 1,127 may betoo high.
gTheseare the figurescontainedineach Five-Year Plan for the last year of
the Plan period.
h Average wage was unavailable for 1939. Interpolation was used to obtain
the figure entered. The basis for the interpolation was the total wage bill
figures for 1938-1940 presented in Holzman, Soviet Taxation, as cited, Table 4.
Source: See Appendix, Notes to Table 6.
At the risk of considerably oversimplifying a very complex prob-
lem, I think it could be stated, as a first approximation, that the
wage inflation and the credit policy which permitted it can be
used to explain Soviet failure to achieve all three financial objectives
listed above. We have already pointed out how wage inflation pushed
up the prices of producer goods by increasing money costs of pro-
duction. Part of the increase in consumer goods prices was similarly
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due to rising wages.73 In the case of consumer goods, of course,
causation operated through both supply and demand: consumer
goods prices were increased not only because of the increase in
money costs of production (this applied particularly to industrial
consumer goods) but also because household incomes were rising
much faster than the output of consumer goods. Finally, unplanned
increases in wage rates contributed to repressed inflation. For to
the extent that the household sector earned more income than the
fiscal authorities had anticipated, with no compensating increases
in output, tax revenues tended to fall short of the amounts needed
to prevent repressed inflation in the consumer goods markets.7
Greater reliance on income taxation would have provided the
Soviets with some built-in flexibility against wage inflation; un-
fortunately for them, commodity taxation, which was preferred for
other reasons, does not have this property.
Because this paper is concerned primarily with Soviet finance,
the explanation of the failure of the state to achieve its financial
objectives has been couched, so far, entirely in terms of Soviet
monetary and fiscal policy. The analysis must be carried one step
further. For while the appropriate monetary conditions may be
necessary for the development of an inflation, they are not sufficient,
as the old quantity theorists would have had us believe. Not only
must managers of Soviet enterprises have had excess funds at their
disposal; they must also have had an incentive to spend them. The in-
centive in the case under discussion must have been strong because,
in both bidding up wages and hoarding materials, managers were de-
fying Soviet law. Why were managers willing to engage in these
unlawful activities? Primarily because the labor and materials they
were attempting to secure were essential to fuffillment of the
tasks assigned to them by the Plan; and the risks attached to under-
fulfillment of planned output, together with the rewards for over-
Until 1935-1936 the percentage of commodity tax in the consumer goods
price structure was increasing rapidly and these taxes may have been the
most important factor in the rapid rise of consumer goods prices. After 1936,
however, the percentage remained relatively stable; from 1936 to 1940 and
thereafter, almost the entire increase in consumer goods prices can be attributed
to wage inflation.
Repressed inflation is generated by other factors also, of course: simple
failure to plan adequate taxes, reduction (either planned or unplanned) in
the percentage of national output available for consumer goods production
(e.g. due to crop failure), and failure to achieve productivity goals in the
production of consumer goods. (Soviet productivity goals were tgpicallyun-
fulfilled in the prewar period.)
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fulfillment, were apparently sufficient to overcome the fear of
penalties connected with overspending the payroll and with com-
modity hoarding.75
The Soviets plan for full employment of labor and important re-
sources; this is assured in theory, by their method of balanced esti-
mates.76 In practice it appears that little or no slack is allowed to
take care of unforeseen contingencies (e.g. crop failure, failure of
productivity to increase as planned, industrial breakdowns of one
sort or another). How else could one explain the use of the "leading
link" in Soviet planning?77 The substantial underfufflulment of output
plans in the prewar period also suggests that the Soviets plan to do
too much with their resources, although here other factors may also
have played a part. Moreover, underfulfihiment of the output plan
for any intermediate products means, of course, that some enter-
prise further along the line is unable to obtain all of the inputs to
which it is entitled under the plan; the output of the second enter-
prise is thereby reduced and third enterprises are adversely affected;
and so on. Under these conditions full employment planning is
tantamount to overfufl employment planning.78 The real demand
for labor and resources, as set forth by the economic plan, exceeds
the physical supply which becomes available in the course of execut-
ing the plan. Soviet credit policy translates this real demand into
effective demand, and the inflation described above is the result.
To facilitate an assessment of the relative importance for Soviet
inflation of fiscal and monetary policies and overfull employment
planning, respectively, the following four situations are distin-
Cf. the interesting discussion by Joseph Berliner entitled "The Informal
Organization of the Soviet Firm," Quarterly Journal of Economics, August 1952,
esp. pp. 356ff.
76 For the most important commodities and for labor the Soviets draw up
balance sheets which contain, on one side, the total supply of the commodity
(by source) and, on the other side, the total demand or uses to which the
commodity is to be put.
The leading link is the industry or sector whose development is considered
most crucial during a planning period (usually a year). Provision is made, in
case shortages develop (and they always do), for the leading link industry to
get highest priority in the allocation of scarce materials. In fact, an elaborate
system of rationing important ommodilies among enterprises is always in use
(see Gregory Bienstock, Solomon M. Schwarz, and Aaron Yugow, in Manage-
ment in Russian Industry and Agriculture, Arthur Feller and Jacob Marschak,
editors, Oxford, 1944, pp. 58ff.).
A high level of investment, it should be noted, is not a prerequisite of
overfull employment planning, as many seem to assume. All that is necessary
is that targets be set higher than availabilities—this can happen with a zero
rate of investment in a planned economy.
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guished: (1) inflationary credit policy and overfull employment
planning, (2) disinflationary credit policy and overfull employment
planning, (8) inflationary credit policy and underemployment plan-
ning, and (4) disinflationary credit policy and underemployment
planning. The results in (1) and (4) are ambiguous: inflation in
the former and absence of inflation in the latter.
With respect to (8), the experience of capitalist nations in an
analogous situation (depression and liberal credit policy) has been
that unless the "real" conditions (e.g. expectations and investment
opportunities) are favorable, liberal credit policy is not likely to
touch off an expansion. The same appears to be true in the Soviet
Union. Managers of Soviet enterprises gear their activities quite
closely to the plan,79 and there is reason to believe that if Soviet
planning were less frenzied, Soviet managers would cease hoarding
materials, bidding up wages, and so forth. In fact, there is evidence
that managers of Soviet enterprises attempt to keep the plan from
being set so high in the first place.80 Thus it appears reasonable to
argue that an inflationary credit policy might not lead to inflation
in the U.S.S.R. if overfull employment planning were not practiced.
With respect to(2), capitalist experience suggests that ex-
pansions maybebrought to an end by credit stringency (e.g. flaw-
trey's theory). But many of the factors which are crucial in the
capitalist case would not operate in the Soviet case or in any situa-
tion in which government investment plays a significant role. For
example, in the Soviet Union, credit stringency would not lead to
rising interest rates and expectations of reduced profits and thence
to a lower level of business activity; rather, the objectives of enter-
prises, as set by the plan, would remain undisturbed by monetary
phenomena. This leads us to believe that while prices of the factors
of production might not be bid up in terms of money because of
credit stringency, possibly some nonmonetary manifestations of
inflation would develop: nonpecuniary rewards would be stressed
and would be used to bid for labor; commodity hoarding would con-
tinue to occur; labor hoarding would develop; more extensive barter
Cf. Berliner, op. cit., p. 349, where he discusses .shturmovshchina. Shtur-
movshchina refers to the "...typicalbreakneck pace of work toward the end
of the month ...inorder to meet the monthly plan." During the first three
weeks of the month the pace is much slower.
80Ibid.,pp. 353-355, refers to what Soviet managers call straYchovka, or the
"safety factor." One of the principal manifestations of the "safety factor is the
striving to have the firm's output plan set at a level well below capacity
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would take place and the prices of scarce goods would tend to be bid
up in terms of other goods.
To summarize: The Soviets followed fiscal and monetary policies
in the 1930's which, under Soviet conditions, proved to be basically
inflationary. These policies would not have led to inflation, we be-
lieve, had the Soviets not simultaneously pursued an overfull employ-
ment planning policy which was inflationary in "real" terms. Soviet
planning policy is believed to have been basically responsible for the
Soviet inflation of the interwar period, though it was, no doubt, aided
and abetted by the pursuance of an inflationary credit policy.
CONQUEST OF INFLATION IN THE POSTWAR PERIOD?
In the postwar years the Soviets appear to have achieved most of
the financial objectives which they espoused but failed to achieve
before the war. The period of financial stability began after the
Currency Reform of December 1947, which wiped out the tremendous
repressed inflation generated during the war years. Since the Reform
there has been neither open nor repressed inflation in the market
for consumer goods. In fact, prices in state and cooperative stores
have been reduced every year for six successive years—the dream
of the 1930's come true. Prices in the free collective farm markets
have declined commensurately and are reported to be very little
above state prices, indicating an absence of repressed inflation.
Producer goods prices were raised sharply in 1949 with the express
purpose of eliminating subsidies. Since then they have declined on
three separate occasions: January and July 1950 and January 1952.8i
Finally, wages, which as we have seen are the real devil in the
piece, appear to be rising much less rapidly than in the prewar
period (if at all).82
8iThereal situation on producer goods is not crystal clear. Jasny (The
Soviet Price Syrtem, as cited, pp. 38 if.) claims that the price increase in 1949
was far too large and that the successive price cuts represent not reductions
in money costs but simply compensation for the earlier "blunder." It should
also be noted that analysis of the budgetary data indicates that subsidies are
probably still being paid to enterprises in the national economy, and these could
conceivably be responsible for the price cuts. These factors notwithstanding,
it seems fairly certain that costs of producer goods are not rising as rapidly
as they did in the prewar period.
82Schwartzestimates a 4 per cent increase in the average wage rate from
1947 to 1948 (Harry Schwartz, "Soviet Labor Policy, 1945-49," The Annals
of the American Academy, May 1949, pp. 81-82). Barker estimates 3 per cent
increases in both 1949 and 1950 (G. R. Barker, "Soviet Labor," Bulletins on
Soviet Economic Development, June 1951, p. 21). Other less direct indicators,
e.g. correlation of average wage rate with bond sales and direct taxes, lead
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It is difficult to say which factor or factors have been decisive
in controlling inflation in the postwar period. It is also almost im-
possible to determine whether financial policy is less inflationary now
than in the prewar period. True, budgetary surpluses since 1946
have been much larger than ever before;83 but we have little in-
formation on the amount of credit extended in this period or on the
extent to which other sources of funds have been utilized. And
there is evidence to indicate that the larger budget surpluses are
being matched by greater extensions of short-term credit.84
It is even more difficult to say whether or not Soviet physical
planning techniques have been altered so as to bring real demand
and supply into closer alignment. Soviet literature in this field,
particularly the recent articles,is not very informative. To my
knowledge, no basic changes have been introduced, but I confess
to incomplete knowledge of these matters.85
Assuming that the combination of Soviet financial and planning
policies is presently as inflationary as it was in the prewar period,
two factors now operate to prevent these policies from having as
inflationary consequences for the labor market (thence the con-
sumer and producer goods markets) as they had in the 1980's. These
are direct controls over labor mobility and State Bank control over
wage expenditures by enterprises and organizations. Several types
of direct controls over labor were introduced in the year or two
before the Soviets entered World War II; these controls were
strengthened during the war years and have remained in force since
to similar conclusions. There has been no direct information in the postwar
period on Soviet average wage rates.
83 Budgetary surpluses as a percentage of total budgetary receipts have been
as follows: 1946, 5.5; 1947, 6.4; 1948, 9.7; 1949, 5.7; 1950, 2.2; 1951, 5.7; and
1952 plan, 6.2. In contrast, surpluses in the prewar period exceeded 5 per cent
only twice (1933, 9.3, and 1934, 5.1) and 3 per cent only four times out of
twelve years. Cf. Holzman, Soviet Taxation, as cited, Chap. 9;also "The
Soviet Budget, 1928-1952," National Tax Journal, September 1953.
84 "In the postwar years, even more than before the war, temporarily free
funds of the budget are used to extend short-term credit to the economy. The
1949 budget provides for an excess of receipts over expenditures of 30.7
billion rubles. This not only strengthens monetary circulation but serves as a
most important source of extension of short-term credit to the economy." K. N.
Plotnikov in Pravda, May 18, 1949.
83 One change which has been made is a vast extension in the number of
commodities which are directly allocated and for which "balances" are con-
structed. Cf. E. Lokshin, "Voprosy planirovaniia material' po-teklmicheskogo
snabzheniia narodnogo khoziaistva S.S.S.R." ("Problems of Planning Material-
Technical Supplies of the National Economy"), Planovoc khoziaistvo, 1950,
No. 2, p. 46.
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the end of the war. The most important of these controls from our
point of view is the regulation which requires every worker to
carry a labor book (which contains his occupational history) and
to hand this book over to his employer (manager of an enterprise)
as a condition of employment; the employer is not required to give
the book back to the worker, except under special circumstances.
This can be used fairly effectively to prevent workers from leaving
a job—or to prevent other employers from pirating one's employees
by offering higher wages or other inducements. Although the Soviet
press gives many indications that in some areas excessive labor
mobility is still a problem, the introduction of labor books must have
helped reduce Soviet wage inflation.86
Throughout the 1930's the Soviets attempted, with apparently no
success, to repress inflation in the labor market by State Bank con-
trol over expenditures for wages. In September 1939, however, a law
was passed which, though it contains some loopholes, has been
fairly effective in reducing these overexpenditures. This law allows
only minor deviations from the principle that the State Bank dis-
burses cash for overexpenditures on wages only to those enterprises
which exceed their gross output targets.87 Immediately after the
decree was introduced, overexpenditures declined sharply,88 and they
continued to decrease every year until 1945, excepting 1942; in
1945, overexpenditures of industrial enterprises, as a percentage of
the authorized wage fund, were "one and one-half times lower"
than in 1939. On the basis of these quantitative statements and
numerous qualitative statements, I consider it probable that con-
siderable headway has been made toward controlling open inflation
86 Other controls over labor mobility are the labor draft for boys of fourteen
to seventeen years of age, which is designed to teach them certain trades and
compel them to work at the trades for a specific number of years, and a regula-
tion which allows the government to transfer skilled workers anywhere in the
U.S.S.R. without regard to their own wishes. Neither of these can be considered
as being as generally significant for wage inflation as the use of the labor books.
87 The text of this decree and related decrees is contained in I. L. Kukulevich
and M. A. Rubin, Planirovanie i analiz trudovykh pokazatelei (Planning and
Analysis of Labor Indicators), Moscow, 1948, Pp. 235-249. A history of control
over expenditures from the wage fund is contained in Kreditnoe i kassovoe
planirovanie (Credit and Cash Planning), V. M. Batyrev, editor, Moscow,
1947, pp. 61 if., and flolzman, Soviet Taxation, as cited, Chap. 2.
88 N. Sokolov, "Gosbank v bor'be za ekonomiiu v narodnom khoziaistve"
("The State Bank in the Struggle for Economies in the National Economy"),
Planovoe khoziaistvo, 1940, No. 3, p. 40.
89 N. Zabozlaev, "Kontrol' gosbanka nad raskhodovaniem foridov zarabotnoi
plain" ("State Bank Control over Wage Fund Expenditures"), Den'gi i kredit,
1946, No. 6-7, p. 8.
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in the labor market by Bank control over wage expenditures. Since
hardly a month goes by, however, without some Soviet economist
calling for greater Bank supervision over the wage fund, we can
assume that this form of control has not reached its ultimate
stringency.
The continued occurrence of overexpenditures of the wage fund,
as well as the need for Bank controls over wages and for labor
books,9° are evidence that Soviet financial and planning policies are
still inflationary. Repression of inflation at the enterprise level does,
of course, largely eliminate rising prices in both the producer and
consumer goods markets, in addition to contributing to the avoidance
of repressed inflation in the consumer goods markets. While this
should make the performance of the Soviet economy more efficient,
it does not eliminate all of the unnecessary evils associated with
overfull employment planning. Thus the existence of repressed in-
flation at the enterprise level means that. the associated problems
of bottlenecks and commodity hoarding will continue to be present;
and the introduction of controls over labor mobility and over wage
levels, if successful, may eventually induce labor hoarding.1 There
is even evidence that the managerial incentive to produce efficiently
and to earn large profits tends to be vitiated by repressed inflation
in the factor markets. Finally, under many circumstances direct con-
trols may be less effective in allocating resources than the market
mechanism, and they are costly to operate. These difficulties are
not likely to be eliminated by further multiplication of direct con-
trols over economic activity. Rather, a basic revision of the Soviet
theory and practice of both physical and financial planning would
be required. Whether or not the Soviets ever undertake such a
revision would seem to depend on two factors: first, on their compre-
hension of the cause of their difficulties; second, on losses to the
national output of sufficient magnitude (by their measurement) to
merit a revision.
90Thelabor book system would probably be retained for other reasons than
controlling inflation. It would, for example, be useful in reducing labor turn-
over even in noninflationary periods, and as a general instrument of control
over the working force.
91hesitate to say which would constitute a more serious problem for the




NOTES TO TABLE 3
Turnover tax:
1928/1929 and 1929/1930: Sum of figures for excise, draft, and other minor
taxes later combined into the turnover tax. Sotsialisticheskoe stroitel'stvo
S.S.S.R. (Socialist Construction of the U.S.S.R.), Moscow, TsUNKhU, 1934,
p. 493.
1931-1940: K. N. Plotnikov, Biudzhet sotsialisticheskogo gosudarstva (Budget
of a Socialist State), Moscow, 1948, pp. 17, 102, and 181.
Profits tax: Ibid., pp. 17, 102, and 181.
Direct taxes: Ibid., pp. 21, 44, 102, and 181.
Social insurance: lbid., pp. 17, 102, and 181.
Sales of government bonds:
1928/1929-1932: SocIalist Constructionof USSR, Moscow, Foreign Languages
Publishing House, 1936, p. 514.
1933-1937: Gosudarstvennyi biudzhet S.S.S.R. za vtoriiu platiletku, 1933-37
(State Budget of the U.S.S.R. In the Second Five-Year Plan), Leningrad,
1939, pp. 8-10.
1938-1940: Plotnikov, op. cit., p. 181 gives only total bonds sold. Assumption
is made that 80 per cent are sold to the population and 20 per cent to
institutions; this ratio held in the years previous.
Total budget receipts: Plotnikov, op. cit., pp. 17, 102, and 181.
Increment to savings deposits:
1928/1929-1932: Sotsialisticheskoe .stroitel'stvo S.S.S.R., as cited, p. 502.
1933-1940: Alexander Baykov and C. R. Barker, "Financial Developments in
the U.S.S.R.," Bulletins on Soviet Economic Development, No. 3, Uni-
versity of Birmingham, August 1950, p. 18. Savings are not counted directly
in estimating total sources of finance, but are counted indirectly as part of
government bond sales since the reserves of savings banks are invested in
government bonds.
Increment to currency in circulation:
1928/1929 and 1929/1980: A. Z. Arnold, Banks, Credit, and Money in
Soviet Russia, Columbia University Press, 1937, pp. 257 and 412.
1931-1986: Money and Banking, n, Geneva, League of Nations, 1938, p. 183.
1940: N. Voznesensky, The Economy of the USSR during World War II,
Public Affairs Press, 1948, p. 81.
1937-1939: Currency in circulation is observed to bear a relationship to size
of the wage bill (payroll), wage rate, and value of retail sales (retail trade
turnover). Using these relationships, estimated for previous years, estimates
were made for 1937-1939. The resuLts were hardly different from those
which would have been obtained by simple extrapolation.
Increment to short-term loans:
1928/1929-1932: Arnold, op. cit., pp. 271 and 372.
1933-1940: Gregory Grossman, "The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,"
in Comparative Banking Systems, B. H. Beckhardt, editor, Columbia Uni-
versity Press, 1954; in 1931 and 1932, state enterprises, which were unable
to repay up to 6 billion rubles in short-term loans, were relieved of these
debts. In their place, government long-term securities were substituted.
This operation technically reduced the amount of short-term credit out-
standing by calling part of the amount by another name. For this reason
we are interested in the total of short-term loans and government securities.
In the late 1930's these securities were retired by the budget. This opera-
tion was purely a bookkeeping transaction and had no impact on the
economy. Therefore, the retirement of the securities is not considered to
have reduced the total of short-term credit at the time.
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Total sources of finance include only short-term credit financed by in-
crements to currency in circulation for reasons mentioned in the text.
Retained profits of state enterprises: These figures are obtained by deducting
the profits tax (above) from total profits. Sources for total profits are:
1928/1929 and 1929/1930: K. Sbmelev, "K edinom finplanu na 1930/31 g."
("Toward a Unified Financial Plan for 1930/31"), Finansovye problemy
planovo go khoziaistva (Financial Problems of a Planned Economy), 1930,
No. 6, p. 19.
1931: Interpolation of 1929/1930 and 1932.
1932: A. K. Suchkov, Gosudarstvennye dokhody S.S.S.R. (Government Reve-
nue of the U.S.S.R.), Moscow, 1949, p. 131.
1933: I. Konovalov, "Finansovyi plan na 1934 g." ("Financial Plan of 1934"),
Planovoe khoziais,tvo, 1934. It should be noted that a figure of 7.3 billion
rubles, in contrast to the figure of 8 billion rubles used here, is cited by
Biulleten', March 1936, No. 127, p. 28, edited by S. N. Prokopovich.
1934: Ibid., p. 28.
1935: C. F. Grinko, Financial Program of the U.S.S.R. for 1936, Moscow,
Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1936, p. 15.
1936: Finansy i kredit S.S.S.R. (Finance and Credit), V. P. D'iachenko,
editor, Moscow-Leningrad, 1940, p. 292.
1937-1940: Suchkov, op.cit., p. 131.
1938/1939: A. G. Zverev, Gosudarstvennye biudzhety soiuza S.S.R., 1938-
1945 gg. (State Budgets of the U.S.S.R.), Moscow, 1946, p. 42 (1939
is plan).
Indivisible fund of collective farms:
1928/1929-1934: Socialist Construction of U.S.S.R., as cited, pp. 346-347.
Figures for 1928/1929 and 1929/1930 were given 'as for the years 1929
and 1930. These figures also include some (unknown amount of) invest-
ment in kind by the collective farms.
1935: According to Grinko, op. cit., p. 9, the money income of the collective
farms in 1935 was 9 billion rubles. According to S. Nosyrev, "Ustav
sel'skhokhoziaistvennoi arteli i finansovoe khoziaistve kolkhozov" ("Statutes
of Agricultural Artels and Finances of Collective Farm Economies"),
Sovetksie /Inansy (Soviet Finance), 1947, No. 1, p. 21, 14.7 per cent of
collective farm money income was deposited in the indivisible fund in
1935.
1987: According to ibid., 12.4 per cent of collective farm money income was
deposited in the indivisible fund in 1987. According toS. Nosyrev,
"Ukrepliat' finansovuiu ditsiplinu v kolkhozakh" ("Strengthen the Fi-
nancial Discipline in the Collective Farms"), Sovetskie finansy, 1945,
No. 11, p. 20, the money income of collective farms in 1937 was 14,180
million rubles.
1938: Nosyrev, "Urekpliat' finansovuiu ditsiplinu v kolkhozakh," as cited,
p. 20.
1940: Nosyrev, "Ustav sel'skhokhoziaistvennoi arteli i finansovoe khoziaistvo
kolkhozov," as cited, p. 24.
1938 and 1939: Interpolation.
Depreciation reserves (amortization fund):
1932: Vtoroi piatiletnii plan razvitiia narodnogo khoziaistva S.S.S.R. (Second
Five-Year Plan for the Development of the National Economy), Gosplan,
Moscow, 1934, Vol. x, p. 420.
1933: Konovalov, op. cit., pp. 177-181.
1985 (plan): Narodno-khoziaistvenni plan na 1935 god (Natianal Economic
Plan for 1935), Moscow, 1935, p. 408.
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1936: G. F. Crinko, Finansovaia programma Soiuzu S.S.R. na 1937 god
(Financial Program of the U.S.S.R. for 1937), Moscow, 1937.
1987: Abram Bergson, "Soviet National Income and Product," Quarterly
Journal of Economics, May 1950, p. 216.
1989: Zverev, op. cit., p. 49. This is the planned figure.
1928/1929-1931 and 1984: E. L. Cranovskii and B. L. Markus, Ekonomika
sotsialisticheskoi promyshlennosti (Economics of Socialist Industry), Mos-
cow, 1940, p. 517, give amortization figures for large-scale industry for
1926-1936. In the years 1932, 1933, 1935, and 1936, for which we have
amortization figures for the whole economy, the total figures are con-
sistently 1.9 times as large as those for large-scale industry. This enables
us to estimate the missing years.
1938 and 1940: Interpolation and extrapolation.
Long-term loans by Agriculture Bank to collective farms:
1931-1932: V. P. D'iachenko, "Finansovaia pomoshch' Sovetskogo gosudarstva
kolkhoznomu stroiu" ("Financial Aid of the Soviet State to Kolkhoz Con-
struction"), Voprosu kolkhoznogo stroitel'stvaS.S.S.R., Moscow, 1951,
p. 255.
1933-1937: Plotnikov, op. cit., p. 140. (Plotnikov also lists loans to collective
farmers for purchase of cattle.)
Adjustment for indirect taxes and profits of state enterprises:It was pointed
out in the text that the indirect taxes as they are listed in the budget include
taxes paid within the government sector of the economy by one organization
or enterprise to another, the incidence of which is never on the household.
It is impossible to adjust indirect taxes precisely to take account of this
because the distribution of these taxes between the household and govern-
ment sectors is not published. For some years now, turnover tax and profits
figures have been published broken down by commissariat. It is possible to
make rough guesses, on the basis of these breakdowns, as to the percentage
of the tax paid by the consumer and the part paid by government organiza-
tions. For example, it was assumed that all profits and turnover taxes originat-
ing in the commissariat of heavy industry were paid by government enter-
prises or organizations; on the other hand, almost all of the taxes and profits
originating in the commissariats of food and procurement were assumed to
have been paid by households, although some allowance was made, for
example, for purchases of goods by the Ministry of the Armed Forces; it
was guessed that about 75 per cent of the turnover tax originating in light
industries was paid by households; and so forth.
Turnover tax data are available by commissariat for 1934-1937 and 1939-
1941, and by commodity for 1936. The sources are:
Year Source
1934 and 1935 planS. N. Prokopovich, Biulleten', March 1935, No. 120,
p. 25.
1936 A. Smilga, "Finansy sotsialisticheskogo gosudarstva"
("Finances of a Socialist State"), Problemy ekonomiki
(Problems of Economics), 1937, No. 2, p. 114.
1936 By commodity: Grinko, op. cit., p. 64.
1937 plan Same as for 1936.
1939 plan Tretiia sessiia verkhovnogo soveta S.S.S.R.: stenogra-
ficheskii otchet (Third Session of Supreme Soviet:
Stenographic Report), May 1939, pp. 828-329.
1940 plan Shestaic sessiia verkhovnogo soveta S.S.S.R.: steno-




1941 plan Vosmaia sessiia verkhovnogo soveta S.S.S.R.: steno-
graficheskii otchet (Eighth Session...), February
1941, pp. 498-499.
The deductions for the turnover tax varied from about one-sixth to one-
ninth.
The adjustment for profits was much more tenuous. Breakdown for total
profits by ministry was only available to me for 1935 (Grinko, op. cit., p. 16)
and 1986 (Smilga, op. cit., p. 112). Deductions from profits are available in
breakdown form for many other years and these aided in making judgments
(this was especially true of the stenographic reports). It was finally decided to
adjust profits downward by one-third for all years; this fraction seemed ap-
propriate in the years for which data were available. It should be remembered
that many taxes (profits) levied originally on producer goods are eventually
included in the cost of consumer goods.
This ratio (one-third) was also used for social insurance and other indirect
taxes. The social insurance estimate was based on data presented by Bergson
("Soviet National Income and Product," as cited, Appendix, p. 19) and is
admittedly very rough; the same ratio was used for other minor indirect taxes
for lack of a better expedient. These items are not very large, and unless the
one-third estimate is very far off the final results will not be significantly
affected.
NOThS TO TABLE 5
The following budget expenditure figures were used for thistable(in
billions of rubles):
1928- 1929-
19291930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940
Education 1.11.72.83.84.96.38.818.916.518.720.322.5
Health .3 .4 .6 .81.01.84.05.66.97.68.29.0
Social insurance 1.11.21.92.93.28.48.75.05.26.07.2[7.81
Social security .1 .1 .1.2 .2 .2 .2 .21.32.0[2.3]3.1
Subsidies to mothers .11.0 .01.11.2
Debt service .3 .4 .41.01.31.91.82.23.52.02.0[2.5]
Year Source
1928/1929 All figures except debt service from N. Rovinski, "Sovetskie finansy
to 19871 kulturnaia revoliutsiia" ("Soviet Finances and the Cultural Revolu-
tion"), Finansy S.S.S.R. za XXX let (Soviet Finances for Thirty
Years), Moscow, 1947, pp. 209 and 218.
Debt service for 1928/1929 to 1982 from Plotnikov, op. cit.,
p. 52, and for 1933-1937 from Gosudarstvennyi biudzhet S.S.S.R.
za vtoruiu piatiletkii, as cited, p. 10.
1928-1940Education, health, and subsidies to mothers from Plotnikov, op.
cit., pp. 220, 228, and 225. Social insurance: for 1938 from ibid.,
p. 219, and for 1989 and 1940 (plan) from Zverev, Gosudarstvennyi
biudzhety soiuza S.S.R., 1938-1945gg.,as cited, p. 83. Social
security: for 1938 and 1939 (plan) from ibid., p. 56, and for 1940
from Plotnikov, op. cit., p. 329. Debt service from D'iachenko,
Finansy i kredit, S.S.S.R.,ascited, p. 280 (1940 is plan).
Methodsand Limitations.Gross national product is calculated as the sum of
two major components: government (plus collective farm) expenditures and
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household expenditures. The sum of total expenditures by the government and
investment expenditures by the collective farms is equal to the sum of the
sources of finance presented in Table 3. (This is because the total of sources
of finance includes a balancing item, currency in circulation, rather than the
total loans of the banking system.) To the extent that any source of finance
is left unspent (e.g. budget surplus), this fact is reflected in the amount (reduc-
tion in this case) of currency required to finance the loans of the State Bank.
Expenditures by the government and collective farms on goods and services
for final use are obtained by deducting from total sources of finance the transfer
payments to the household sector. Indirect taxes have also been removed by
an adjustment noted in the text.
Expenditures by households for final goods and services are obtained by
deducting from total household money income the total of taxes on households
(including indirect taxes) and all household outlays other than those for goods
and services (e.g. increments to savings deposits and to cash hoards, and trade
union dues).2 The sum of expenditures by households and by the government
for final goods and services is equivalent to a "modified" gross national product,
net of indirect taxes.8
In addition to the crudity of some of the estimates, gross national product
thus obtained suffers the following three defects: First, investment by industry
from private profits and private depreciation funds has not been included. While
this exclusion will not significantly affect the totals after, say, 1932, those
for 1928/1929 to 1931 may be moderately understated and the proportion of
consumption expenditures to national product correspondingly overstated. Sec-
ond, as already noted, some real costs of production are not explicitly recog-
nized and paid for by the Soviets (e.g. rent and long-term interest) and are
therefore omitted from the present estimates. This leads to an understatement
of gross national product; it should not affect the proportions between govern-
ment and household expenditures, however. Some writers have imputed these
costs to profits of state enterprises.4 While this procedure may be satisfactory
for any single year, profits vary too arbitrarily in amount to be used for a
whole series of years. Third, neither consumption nor investment in kind is
included in the estimates presented.. The omission of these figures results in
an understatement of gross national product and an understatement of the
percentage of household consumption to gross national product (since con-
sumption in kind is undoubtedly greater than investment in kind). Baran and
1Cf.discussion on page 242 above.
2Thesedata are available in F. D. Holzman, "The Burden of Soviet Taxa-
tion," American Economic Review, September 1953, Tables 1 and 2.
8Netof indirect taxes does not imply factor cost, however. Consumer
purchases include, for example, expenditures on the collective farm markets
at prices which, in many years, were considerably higher than the prices (in-
cluding indirect taxes) of the same commodities sold by the state. Some devia-
tion from factor cost also exists because of subsidies, although, for reasons
mentioned above, it is believed that this is not serious. To summarize: we have
considerable doubt that ostensible subsidies to the consumer, via subsidies to
the machine tractor stations, are, in fact, real subsidies because the receipts in
kind of the machine tractor stations are accounted for at the very low obligatory
delivery prices. Moreover, the low cost to the state of subsidized producer
goods isoffset, at least in part, by current budgeted subsidies to producer
goods enterprises operating at a loss.
4E.g. Paul Baran, "Soviet National Income and Product for 1940," Review
of Economic Statistics, November 1947, p. 230.
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Bergson5 have made estimates of agricultural income in kind for 1940 and
1937, respectively; the effect of taking these figures into account in our esti-
mates will be indicated below. It is not feasible to estimate income in kind
for other years; nor can the Bergson and Baran estimates, for that matter, be
considered much more than statistical expedients.
Some idea of the modifications required in the ratio of government to house-
hold consumption by inclusion of income in kind is indicated in Table A-i,
which incorporates the Bergson and Baran estimates. The inclusion of income
in kind in the years 1937 and 1940 increases the share in national output of
households by about 6 percentage points :° to 60.5 per cent in 1937 and 54.3
per cent in 1940. These percentages, it should be noted, are considerably higher
than Jasny's for both 1937 and 1940 (51.2 and 45.5 per cent),T but slightly
less than Bergson's for 1937 (64.2 per cent). The gross national product total
is about 10 per cent less than Bergson's estimate of 221.9 billion rubles for
1937, and about 5 per cent less than the comparable Baran figure for 1940.8
The discrepancies are believed to be attributable primarily to the expedient
employed by both Baran and Bergson of imputing missing factor costs. Recon-
ciliation with Jasny's work is impossible because of differences in methodologies
employed.
TABLE A-i
Rough Estimate of Gross National Product, Including Income in Kind,
1937 and 1940
1937 1940
BillionsPer Cent BillionsPer Cent
of Rublesof Totalof Rublesof Total
Government consumption, markets 69.5
Government consumption, kinds 8.Ob •
127.8
10.Ob
Total government 77.5 39.5 137.8 45.7
Household consumption, marketa86.4
Household consumption, kind" 30.Oe




Total household 118.9 60.5 163.9 54.3
Gross national output 196.4 100.0 301.7 100.0
"Consumption is here taken to mean the use of both consumption and in-
vestment goods.
b Guess as to the amount of investment in kind for purely illustrative
purposes.
C Abram Bergson, "Soviet National Income and Product," Quarterly Journal
Abram Bergson, "Soviet National Income and Product," Quarterly Journal
of Economics, May 1950, p. 214.
6 If Jasny's estimates are to be trusted, income in kind is much smaller than
is indicated by Bergson or Baran. His estimates show income in kind to be
less than 15 per cent of total household consumption (cf. Naum Jasny, The
Soviet Economy during the Plan Era, Stanford University Press, 1951,p. 66).
Ibid., Error and Omission Sheet (dated June 20, 1952).
8 The comparable figure would be Baran's national income of 802.38 billion
rubles plus his depreciation allowance of 15.5 billion rubles.
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TABLE A-i (cont.)
of Economics, May 1950, p. 214. This includes an unspecified amount of in-
vestment in kind of agriculture.
d p• Baran, "Soviet National Income and Product for 1940," Review of Eco-
nomic Statistics, November 1949, p. 229.
Estimate based on Bergson's current figure for 1937, and Jasny's estimate
for 1937 and 1940 in 1926/1927 prices (see Naum Jasny, The Soviet Economy
during the Plan Era, Stanford University Press, 1951, p. 66).
NOTES TO TABLE 6
This table was compiled jointly by Raymond P. Powell and myself.
Source:
Planned figures:
1928: Piatiletnii plan narodno-khoziaistvennogo stroitel'stva S.S.S.R. (Five-
Year Plan of National Economic Construction), Moscow, Gosplan, 1929,
Vol. 2, pp. 208-209.
1931, 1934, and 1936: Planovoe khoziaistve, 1930, No. 12, p. 869; 1934, No.
5-6, p. 199; 1936, No. 2, p. 281.
1933, 1935, and 1937: Charles Betteiheim, La planiflcation soviétique, Paris,
Marcel Rivière, 1945, 2nd ed., p. 306.
1932 FYP: Summary of the Fulfillment of the First Five Year Plan, Interna-
tional Publishers, no date, p. 296.
1937 FYP: The Second Five Year Plan, translated by I. B. Lasker and John
Swift, International Publishers, pp. 624-625.
1942 FYP:Tretii piatiletnii plan razvitiia narodnogo khoziaistva Soiuza
S.S.R. (Third Five-Year Plan for the Development of the National Econ-
omy of the U.S.S.R.), Moscow, Gosplan, 1939, pp. 228-229.
Realized figures:
1928: K. N. Plotnikov, Biudzhet sotsialisticheskogo gosudarstva (Budget of
a Socialist State), Moscow, 1948, p. 72.
1929-1935: Socialist Construction in the U.S.S.R., Moscow, State Planning
Commission, 1936, pp. 368-369.
1936-1940: Abram Bergson, "A Problem in Soviet Statistics," Review of
Economic Statistics, November 1947, p. 236.
C 0 M M E N T
RAYMOND P. POWELL, Yale University
Mr. Holzman has provided us with both a statistical record of
the sources of Soviet finance and an appraisal of the consequences of
financial policy for Soviet economic development. Those who them-
selves have done battle with Soviet materials will recognize the
expenditure of energy and ingenuity which his paper represents.
(1) The usefulness of the paper's statistical data seems to me to
be impaired somewhat by an apparent confusion over the meaning
of the term "sources of finance." Since this is not an uncommon
confusion in discussions of the financing of economic development,
and since it here gives the Soviet accounts an unnecessarily exotic
character, an attempted clarification may be in order.
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To put it crudely, one may ask either, Where did the money
come from? or, Where did the saving come from? Statistically, the
two answers may be similar, depending upon the structure of
financial institutions. Analytically, the two are distinct. In the paper
at hand, the tables appear to be answers to the second question;
the text for the most part, but with frequent exceptions, is in terms
of the first.
The distinction could be made more precise in the following
way: We could conceivably record the total of money flows, on
current and capital account, among the several sectors of the
Soviet economy: let us say, households, enterprises, the budget, and
the banks.1 Making the same simplifying assumptions as Holzman
apparently makes—that all charges accruing are paid, that sales
equal output for each enterprise (to avoid investments "in kind"),
and that omitted transactions are zero—we could construct for each
sector an equation of this form: money receipts plus increases in
monetary liabilities equal money expenditures plus increases in
monetary assets.
Given sufficient data, we would probably be wise to stop at this
point. We could bypass such problems as the meaning of "sources of
finance" and move directly to an analysis of particular money flows.
Lacking the necessary data, we must somehow consolidate the
sector accounts.
Two consolidations, which are conventional and which yield
familiar results, are immediately suggested. We could, on the one
hand, deduct current expenditures (wages and taxes) from both
sides of the equation for the enterprise sector and obtain the counter-
part of our own sources-and-uses-of-corporate-funds account. Since
Holzman has found it advisable to eliminate the transactions be-
tween budget and enterprises, we could consolidate the accounts
of these two sectors, with this result:
(1) Taxes + retained profits + depreciation + State Bank and Sav-
ings Bank loans =budgetpurchases of goods and services and
transfers to households + gross investment2 + increases in the
money balances of budget and enterprises
1 This can be done for 1937 by combining banking data for that year with
the data given in Abram Bergson's Soviet National Income and Product in
1937, Columbia University Press, 1953.
2 Investment is used here in the usual sense of additions to plant, equipment,
and inventories, with capital gains excluded from both sides of the equation.
In reality, inventory gains and losses are known to have been large in the
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This is still analogous to a sources-and-uses account, allowance
being made for the inclusion of budget transactions. Total loans ap-
pear on the receipt side, increases in money holdings on the expendi-
ture side. It answers the question, Where did the money come from?
i.e. What were the money receipts from which budget and (noncur-
rent) enterprise expenditures were made? It records what I should
judge is most commonly meant by "sources of finance."
It serves, moreover, a familiar and useful analytical purpose. We
would like to know what determined the supply of funds available
for developmental purposes and what determined the uses to which
they were put. Were the two equated by variations in interest rates,
by rationing on the supply side, by profit considerations on the
demand side, or in some other way?
We could, on the other hand, deduct current expenditures from
both enterprise and household accounts and consolidate all four
sector accounts. The result would be this:
(2) Personal saving + taxes + retained profits + depreciation
budget purchases of goods and services and transfers to
households + gross investment
This is the equally familiar gross saving and investment account.
Both bank loans and money balances here disappear. Total re-
ceipts and expenditures, given our present simplifying assumptions,
are less than those in the first equation by the amount of additions to
the money balances of the budget and enterprises. This answers
the question, Where did the saving come from? i.e. How was the
income arising out of current production disposed of? This too
serves a familiar purpose, in analysis of the determinants of the
level of income, employment, and prices.
I do not suggest that these two equations are independent of one
another. Our central problem is to determine how changes in the
variables of one impinge upon those of the other. I argue only that
we have two distinct questions with equally distinct answers.8
There is, finally, a third possible consolidation of our total money-
flow accounts, though one which is less conventional. We could
Soviet Union, but I am uncertain of their treatment in profit and investment
figures as recorded both in Soviet sources and in Holzman's tables.
In a more familiar institutional setting the same contrast could be drawn
in terms of the market for securities (or loanable funds, or "money") and
the market for goods and services.
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consolidate the three sectors—enterprises, budget, and banks—with
this result:
(3) Taxes + retained profits + depreciation + increases in the
money balances of households =budgetpurchases of goods and
services and transfers to households + gross investment
This is identical with the second equation, except that additions
to the money holdings of households have been substituted for per-
sonal saving, to which, again on present assumptions, they are
equal. As in the second equation, bank loans do not appear among
receipts nor money balances of enterprises and the budget among
expenditures. This can best be regarded as a variant of the saving-
investment account, and would appear to serve much the same
analytical purpose. It has the advantage of specifying the assets in
which personal saving eventuates.
In Holzman's paper the data on "sources of Soviet finance" are
provided in Tables 2 and 3, both of which are constructed in the
same way. The receipt side in both is clearly the receipt side of our
third equation, i.e. a saving-plus-taxes total, personal saving hav-
ing been replaced by additions to households' money balances. The
expenditure side, which is complete only in Table 2, is less obvious,
but would appear (unless the footnotes indicate something, dif-
ferent) to approximate the receipt side of a sources-and-uses ac-
count. That is to say, in Table 2 "saving and taxes" appear to have
been equated to "investment and government purchases of goods
and services," but the latter has been classffied not by kind of
expenditure (plant, equipment, etc.) but by the sources from which
those expenditures were financed (budgetary funds, retained profits,
and bank loans). This would, at any rate, explain the otherwise
paradoxical treatment of bank loans as "expenditures" (Table 3).
It follows, incidentally, that if this is the proper interpretation,
Table 2 (and Table 3, if completed) ought not to balance. Total
"sources" exceed "saving plus taxes" by the increase in money
balances of enterprises and the budget. In Table 2 the budget's
balances have been deducted from the "sources" account. Enter-
prise balances have not, so an equivalent discrepancy ought to re-
main and, perhaps coincidentally, in fact does remain: in 1936,
enterprise bank balances increased by about 2.3 billion rubles,4 the
amount of the discrepancy shown in the table.
See Table ix in my dissertation, Soviet Monetarq PoUc!,, University of
California, 1952.
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Otherwise, the meaning of these two tables is clear, though one
might question (see Table 3 and also pages 232 and 254)inwhat
sense savings bank deposits are any more voluntary or any more
"savings" than are. additions to the currency holdings of households.
I have belabored these obvious and perhaps trivial issues with
the aim of establishing, first, that when Holzman speaks (pages
242, 248, 253 and Table 3) of currency issue, or of a total of which
it is a component, as a "source of finance" he is using the term in
a different sense from that which it has (pages 230, 253, and, at
least implicitly, throughout section 3) when bank loans are treated
as a "source of finance." Second, the fact that a consolidation such
as my third equation or Holzman's tables eliminates bank loans and
the money balances of the budget and enterprises from the account
in no way implies that these are insignificant variables. That they
are significant is apparent from what Holzman says in his conclud-
ing section. It would have been helpful to have had a record of
their behavior, i.e. an ordinary sources-and-uses account. (We do,
of course, have bank loans appended to Table 3, as "expenditures.")
Finally, that the same consolidation retains currency issue in the
accounts in no way implies that this is the relevant variable for
monetary policy or that it properly measures the inflationary impact
of the Bank's operations, which are the apparent inferences of the
statements made on page 242 and page 258. The Soviet State
Bank no more controls (or controlled) the volume of currency in
circulation than does our banking system, and its currency emission
is no better a measure of its contribution to Soviet inflation than
would a similar record be of inflation in the U.S. economy.
With respect to Table 5, which represents an interesting attempt
to calculate nonconsumption uses of output from the total of saving
and taxes, I would raise two questions. First, when the problems
at hand are financial, is anything gained by adjusting the value of
transactions from a market price to what approximates a factor
cost valuation—particularly when such adjustments inevitably add
an uncertain error to figures which are already of questionable
reliability? And second, is a total of nonconsumption expenditures,
inclusive of the current costs of the machine-tractor stations, of the
operating costs of government, and of military outlays, a satisfactory
measure of "developmental" expenditures? The answer to the lat-
ter depends in part, of course, upon the availability of data on the
relevant expenditures.
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(2)Inthe concluding section of his paper Holzman undertakes
to analyze the consequences of the choice of financial sources (in the
sense of my first equation) for the course of Soviet development.
This is nearly synonymous with attempting to answer the question
of the causes of the Soviet inflation of 1928-1941. For the latter,
Holzman offers two explanations, which, however, are meant to be
not so much competitive as proceeding at different levels of ab-
straction.
The first of these is a "real" theory which attributes. Soviet in-
flation, ultimately, to an "overfull employment planning policy." On
the face of it, this, or some other "real" explanation, is certainly more
plausible than any explanation running in monetary terms. The
Soviet Union experienced real changes of such magnitude in these
years that inflation appears to have been an inevitable result.
Nevertheless, this strikes me as being neither a testable hypothesis
nor, for that matter, an inflation hypothesis. It is untestable because
we have no way of determining how full employment plans in any
year would have looked, or of measuring the divergence of actual
plans from that hypothetical norm. We do not know how far plans
served the purpose of targets, and thus how far realizations were
a function of plans. Holzman, moreover, is more confident than I am
that the inflationary pressure from Soviet enterprises ceases when
plans have been fulfilled.
Other "real" theories of Soviet inflation are testable but do not
fit the facts well. The most common of these is the argument, never
to my knowledge worked out in detail,' that inflation was produced
by the high rate of investment, by the allocation of a very large
proportion of current output to nonconsumption uses. Holzman re-
jects this (see footnote 78) and I think rightly. The great hurdle
for any such explanation is the extremely erratic path of Soviet
inflation. Average wage rates rose by more than 25 per cent in 1932
and 1936, by less than 10 per cent in 1933, 1937, and, evidently,
1940,° and there is no apparent correspondence between fluctuations
in wages and fluctuations in the level of investment.
Holzman's particular "real" theory, on the other hand, does not
seem to have much to do with inflation, unless that elastic word
It seems to be implicit, for example, in Alexander Cerschenkron's remarks
in Soviet Economic Growth, Abram Bergson, editor, Row, Peterson, 1953, pp.
30-31. ("The high rate of nonconsumption is closely connected with inflation-
ary pressures and the specific inefficiencies which attach themselves to in-
flationary processes.")
See Holzman's Table 6.
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is to be stretched inordinately. I am not sure in what kind of infla-
tion "prices of the factors of production might not be bid up in terms
of money" but "possibly some nonmonetary manifestations of in-
flation would develop" (page 263), or what is meant by a policy
"which was inflationary in 'real' terms" (page 264). Certainly, no
one has supposed that the path of Soviet development would have
been smooth in the absence of an excess of monetary demand. In-
deed, I would doubt that the rate of Soviet growth would have been
significantly accelerated or decelerated by any conceivable behavior
of the prices of inputs and products.7 But this does not require that
we enter all strains and stresses in the Soviet economy under the
category of inflation.
The monetary explanation offered here seems to me, on the other
hand, to fit reasonably well what we know of Soviet institutions and
the available statistical data. Though I shall not attempt it here,
I think it can be shown:8
1. That the highly variable "source of finance," State Bank loans,
was in fact a relatively stable function of the value of working
capital stocks—and as the result of a deliberate but mechanical bank-
ing policy. This was an economy of "rationed credit," where the
ration was inflexible but exceedingly liberal.
2. That the equally variable "use" of funds, additions to money
balances of the Soviet state budget (the reported budget surplus),
tended, to offset the Bank's operations, but did so erratically and
inadequately.
3. That, as Holzman shows, given this net injection of money
(bank loans minus budget surplus), households and enterprises
had the motivation and the opportunity to increase their rates of
expenditure to a multiple of the initial injection.
4. That the rise in these rates of expenditure produced, with
varying lags, rises in commodity prices, which in turn increased
the value of working capital stocks—which induced a rise in bank
loans, and so on. There was, in effect, a built-in mechanism of cumu-
lative inflation.
In this process the decision to rely chiefly upon indirect taxes
played a strategic role. Given this decision, and given the supply
of goods to be made available to consumers, the Soviet authorities
could forestall or reduce suppressed inflation only by resorting to
'Becauseof the dominance of direct physical controis in the system.
8Datasupporng. these assertions can be found in my Soviet Monetary
Policy, as cited.
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open inflation, by raising the prices of consumer goods. Moreover,
given the decision to impose the turnover tax, for the most part,
as goods entered the distribution network (for agricultural goods,
as they were transferred from procurement to processing organs)
rather than at the point of final sale, any rise in consumers' prices
was reflected back in the value of inventories, and thus in bank
loans, regardless of the behavior of costs.
This process, finally, was no more wholly independent of "real"
forces than was' any other inflation of which we have knowledge.
Real forces in the sense of psychological motivations were clearly
crucial for the behavior of households and enterprises and prob-
ably crucial for that of the central authorities themselves. Real
forces in the sense of physical ones came into play at a number
of points, most obviously in determination of the price level which
would clear the market for consumer goods. But there was no
simple and direct dependence of monetary upon real variables, nor
is there any obvious covariation of the two. To an exceptionally
large degree, Soviet economic development and Soviet inflation
may be regarded as independent phenomena.
As Holzman points out, the evidence is insufficient for judging
whether the postwar decline of prices and apparent stabilization of
wages are attributable to the restraining of monetary demand or
to the tightening of direct wage controls. It is worth noting, how-
ever, that whereas in the prewar period Soviet managers showed
an amazing capacity for evading wage controls, the rate of inflation
(as measured by the total wage bill) nevertheless progressively
declined. From 1929 to 1932 the wage bill quadrupled, from 1933
to 1936 it more than doubled, from 1937 to 1940 it rose by less than
75 per cent. In the same three time intervals the surpluses accumu-
lated by the budget (and usually immobilized as deposits at the
State Bank) rose from 6 to 40 to 75 per cent of the total loans issued
by the State Bank. Such evidence as we have suggests that in the
postwar period this ratio has been still higher and for the entire
period from 1941 to 1952 may approach 100 per cent.° The obvious
inference is that the budget has finally attained sufficiently large
9Itwould be more accurate to relate the budget surplus to the total money
stock, which is usually greater than State Bank loans. Loans are used here
because money stock figures are unavailable for the postwar period. The ratios
given are reliable only as rough indices of the change over time in budget
offsets to bank lending, not as measures of the absolute size of the offset. Data
for the calculations are taken from Tables ii,xxiv,and xxvi in Soviet Monetary
Policy, as cited, and from Pravda, August 6, 1953, p. 2.
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surpluses to more than offset the inflationary impact of bank lend-
ing, but this is an unverifiable hypothesis in the present state of our
knowledge.
(3) I would like to conclude by recurring to the theme of my
opening remarks, the meaning of "sources of finance," but only with
respect to an odd detail.
I have said that one meaning of the term is the source of "money"
and have indicated that this single meaning covers two different
processes. For enterprises, households, and the budget, "sources" in
this sense are money receipts from other sectors. For banks, "sources"
are monetary liabilities incurred, which is a shorthand way of say-
ing money which they have received from no one but which they
themselves have created—this, after all, is what distinguishes them
as banks. But there is nothing improper in speaking of currency
emission and deposits as the sources which "finance" bank loans
(see page 251, for example) so long as the process involved is not
misunderstood.
It should be noted, however, that the Soviet view of banking is
not ours, though it is a familiar one. In the standard Soviet view,10
banks are (except for currency emission) simply financial inter-
mediaries, paying out the deposits of one client (budget or enter-
prise) in loans to others, the volume of loans being determined by
the volume of deposits, and not, as we would have it, the other way
around. Therefore, when a Soviet economist states, as in the quota-
tion in footnote 84, that "In the postwar years, even more than
before the war, temporarily free funds of the budget are used to
extend short-term credit to the economy" (italics in the original),
this is not to be read to mean that "larger budget surpluses are
being matched by greater extensions of short-term credit" (Holz-
man, same page) but rather that short-term credit is being matched
by larger budget surpluses. This statement, incidentally, substanti-
ates the conclusion I have suggested above.
REPLY BY THE AUTHOR
I am indebted to Powell for his comments on my paper. In par-
ticular, the methodological discussion of the first half of his corn-
10 Cf., for instance, A. M. Aleksandrov, Finansy i kredit S.S.S.R., Moscow,
1948, pp. 251 and 255; Z. V. Atlas and E. Ia. Breg'l, Denezhnoe obraschenie
i kredit S.S.S.R., Moscow, 1947, p. 46; C. A. Kozlov, Sovetskie den'gi, Mos-
cow, 1939, p. 227; and M. Usoskin, Osnovyc kreditnogo dela, Moscow, 1946,
p. 94.
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ments places my statistical estimates in a more appropriate analytical
framework. My remarks. will be confined to the major points raised
in the remainder of Powell's comments which deal with the causes
of Soviet inflation. I think it is quite clear that our differences are
differences in emphasis rather than in choice of basic variables. How-
ever, for purposes of this conference, the topic is of sulficient im-
portance to warrant some additional remarks. Soviet industrialization
provides an example of large-scale capital accumulation by a nation
with a very low standard of living. This experience is relevant in
thinking about the industrialization of backward areas. An important
problem faced by the Soviets and one likely to be faced by any back-
ward nation (or advanced nation, for that matter) attempting rapid
capital formation and economic development is that of coping with
inflationary pressures. Unless we are quite clear about the relative
importance of the various factors which have contributed to Soviet
inflation, the lessons inherent in the Soviet experience may go
unlearned.
(1)Powellfeels that my overfull employment planning hypoth-
esis of Soviet inflation is not testable. He says (page 279): "... we
have no way of determining how full employment plans in any
year would have looked, or of measuring the divergence of actual
plans from that hypothetical norm. We do not know how far plans
served the purpose of targets, and thus how far realizations were
a function of plans." But are such direct observations necessarily
required to prove that the Soviets planned to do more with their
resources than availabilities permitted? I would maintain that the
existence of overfull employment plans in the prewar period can
be inferred from three other observations: there were (1) powerful
incentives of both the carrot and the stick variety designed to
insure plan fulfillment and (2) substantial areas in which output
plans were underfulfilled as indicated by Soviet figures, at the same
time that there was (3) a scarcity of both labor and nonlabor in-
puts in industry as indicated by frequent references in Soviet litera-
ture to bottlenecks, commodity hoarding, and intense competition
for workers on the labor market. The occurrence of this scarcity
(3) is strong evidence that underfulfiliment (2) was not caused by
a failure of incentives (1) to operate. When Powell argues that "We
do not know how far plans served the purpose of targets" he is
ignoring the material of Berliner's which I presented on page 261.
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This, incidentally, does not exhaust the evidence presented by
Berliner in support of this point.
Powell is correct, of course, in suggesting that inflationary pres-
sures originating in the enterprise sector may continue even after
plans have been fulfilled. There are several reasons for believing,
however, that such pressures would tend to subside after the plan
has been achieved. First, as Berliner has demonstrated, the marginal
output premiums connected with the achievement of the plan are
much larger than those for subsequent ,overfulfihlment. Second, al-
though the reverse is, true in the case of Directors' Fund bonuses,
these have a much smaller incentive effect than the output premiums
for reaions' discussed elsewhere.2 Third, Berliner's "safety factor"
would act as a strong disincentive factor once the plan had been ful-
filled. Finally, the incentive which arises from fear of punishment
or of demotion because of poor performance' would also cease to
operate after the plan had been fulfilled.
(2)Asubstantial part of Powell's argument against my position
seems to be based on a confusion about my "real" theory' of Soviet'
inflation. Having argued against my overfull employment planning
hypotheses, he proceeds to write as thugh I had also proposed
the high rate of investment as an explanation of Soviet inflation.
These' arguments are presented in spite of his explicit recognition
(page 279)' that I have rejected this explanation; reference is made
to my footnote 78, where the opinion is expressed that overfull
ernploymentplanning may be practiced though the rate of invest-
ment (and of economic development) is small or even zero.8 But
then on the next page, as part of his refutation of my position,
Powell says: "Certainly, no one has supposed that the path of Soviet
development would have been smooth inthe absence of an excess of
monetary demand. Indeed, I would doubt that the rate of Soviet
growth would have been significantly accelerated or decelerated by
1 Berliner, of course, is concerned with the monthly, quarterly, and annual
plans of enterprises. When we spoke earlier in the paragraph of plan fulfill-.
ment, we were referring to the quarterly and annual plans of industries and
commissariats, i.e. the aggregates of the enterprise plans. The, Five-Year Plans
are to be viewed as more in the nature of general policy goals than in the
nature of operational targets.
2 Joseph Berliner, "The Informal Organization of the Soviet Firm," Quarterly
Journal of Economics, August 1952, and F. D. Holzman, "The Profit-Output
Relationship of the Soviet Firm: Comment," Canadian Journal of Economics
and Political Science, November 1953, pp. 523-533.
8would admit, of course, that in a situation which called for a zero rate
of net investment, the chances are the tempo of planning would probably be
much slower.
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any conceivable behavior of the prices of inputs and products. But
this does not require that we enter all strains and stresses in the
Soviet economy under the category of inflation." A similar argu-
ment is presented at the middle of page 281. These arguments are
clearly based On a misunderstanding of my position. Powell is in
error when he asserts that I "enter all strains and stresses in the
Soviet economy under the category of inflation." My position is
simply that "real" inflationary pressures are generated in the factor
markets by the Soviet practice of setting output targets too high to
be achieved with available supplies of raw materials, equipment,
and labor, and in view of projected productivity levels. The Soviet
system of rewards and penalties ensures that serious attempts will
be made to achieve these targets. This creates a very specific type
of inflationary impulse which, as noted above, is neither directly
nor necessarily associated with the rapid rate of Soviet economic
growth. Presumably, this source of inflationary pressure could be
remOved by setting targets at levels consistent with the supply of
the factors of production; at the same time, investment and economic
growth could be maintained unchanged at current high rates4 since
production cannot, after all, exceed the limits .set upon it by the
supply of the factors of production, despite Soviet overfull employ-
ment plans.
(8) Powell presents some interesting material in support of a
monetary explanation of Soviet inflation. He shows that changes
in the Soviet inflationary process were correlated with changes
in the relationship between the budgetary surplus and State Bank
loans. It hardly seems necessary to point out that this correlation
cannot be taken to ascribe a causative role to the monetary factor,
as Powell implies. That the tail follows the dog certainly does not
prove the tail is pushing the dog. From a theory of inflation which
assigns (as I' have done) a' permissive rather than a causative role
to money, one would also predict a close relationship between the
financial variables and the level of costs and prices (open inflation).
The crucial question in my opinion, and one to which Powell has
not addressed himself, is, Why did the managers of Soviet enterprises
compete so strongly for both workers and nonlabor factors of pro-
duction? The money created by the banking system must, after all,
be spent by managers of enterprises before it can have an inflation-
See preceding footnote.
Though he asserts more than once in his comments the importance of
"real" factors, -
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ary effect. Powell admits that "Real forces in the sense of psycho-
logical motivations were clearly crucial for the behavior of house-
holds and enterprises and probably crucial for that of the central
authorities themselves" (page 281). In view of this admission, and
the evidence which I presented to indicate that plant managers gear
themselves fairly closely to plan (pages 261 and 268), it seems to
me that it was up to Powell to demonstrate that the availability of
fundr, per Se, was the driving force behind the observed inflationary
process. For to demonstrate anything less than thisis to admit
in effect that the monetary factor played a permissive rather than
causative role, the position which I took in my paper.
(4) Though Powell and I are in agreement that the postwar "de-
flation" may have been due either to "the restraining of monetary
demand or to the tightening up of direct wage controls," he empha-
sizes the former, and I the latter, explanation. The basic difficulty
with the monetary explanation, it seems to me, is that it implies
the elimination of repressed inflation in the factor markets. That is
to say, the stability of prices cannot be attributed at the same time
to both fiscal and direct controls: if fiscal policy has been successful
in reducing excess liquidity in the factor markets, direct controls
are redundant; if direct controls are responsible, excess liquidity
must still be present. If Powell were right, one would expect a relaxa-
tion of direct controls and an end to commodity hoarding in the
postwar Soviet Union. There is no evidence that these have occurred;
direct allocation of producers' goods and raw materials has been
substantially extended (cf. my footnote 85), the Soviet journals con-
tinue to inveigh against commodity hoarding, direct controls over
labor mobility (the passbook system) have never been relaxed, and
State Bank controls over wage fund expenditures are more stringent
than before the war and the cry is for still greater stringency. In
view of these facts, I cannot believe that a more judicious budget
surplus—bank credit policy was responsible in any causal sense for
the Soviet price decline. The increased use of direct controls, on
the other hand, seems to me a much more plausible explanation.
In my opinion, these controls would not be pursued with such vigor
were they not still needed to repress inflation. As a matter of fact,
the success of the Soviets in repressing inflation in the labor market
by use of direct controls has been, no doubt, a contributing factor
to the size of the budget surpluses realized in the postwar period.
Soviet law provides that excess funds (working capital) held by
enterprises shall be automatically deducted into the budget. To the
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extent that enterprises have funds in their deposit accounts with
which to bid up wages (due to the large amount of short-term credit
outstanding) but cannot do so because of direct controls over labor
mobility and over wage-fund expenditures, the budget is regularly
provided with a source of revenue not otherwise available. And,
of course, to the extent that inflation in the labor market is repressed,
budget expenditures for wages are held down below what they
would otherwise be. Unfortunately, there is no way, to my knowl-
edge, of ascertaining the relative contributions of these factors to
the large budgetary surpluses of the postwar period.
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